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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Origins of the Report – STUC Conference Resolution 
 
The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) Annual Conference of 2009, held in Perth, 
unanimously passed a resolution on Performance Management, proposed by the 
Communication Workers Union and seconded by Unite the Union (Finance Services 
Sector). The resolution acknowledged that Performance Management was now 
commonplace in public and private sector organisations, a central element in Human 
Resource Management (HRM) policy and practice.   
 
Rather than being adopted as a means to encourage employees to improve their 
performance, the resolution suggested that Performance Management was all too often 
being used ‘to pressurise workers into producing more, drive down wages and create 
quotas for underperformers and manage workers out of their jobs’. Indeed, Performance 
Management processes were ‘a particularly brutal method of making workers behave 
and react to company imposed standards’. Workers who failed to measure up to strict 
Performance Management templates were being readily discarded, it was contended.  
 
A key aspect of the resolution and, indeed, of the conference debate it stimulated, was the 
possible consequence that workers subjected to such exigencies might suffer mental 
health  problems. Negative effects might be reflected in increased sickness absence rates. 
Delegates reported on cases from their own experience where mental health symptoms, 
particularly stress and depression, were, they believed, related to new intensive forms of 
‘people management’.  
 
Given the importance of these concerns, the Conference resolved to commission a 
research report ‘to establish the cost and affect Performance Management processes are 
having on the workforce and in various sectors, including the amount of management 
time which is spent implementing them’. The concluding, and perhaps most important, 
sentence in the resolution requested that this research attempt to establish whether a link 
could be established between Performance Management processes and the rise in 
workplace mental health problems.  
 
1.2  About the Author 
 
Phil Taylor is Professor of Work and Employment Studies and Assistant Dean 
International at the Strathclyde Business School at the University of Strathclyde. 
Professor Taylor has researched and published extensively in areas that are relevant to the 
proposed study, including call centres, the white collar labour process, Human Resource 
Management, lean working, occupational health and safety, gender and work 
organization and trade unions and employee voice. He was a lead member of an 
Economic and Social Science Research Council project under the prestigious Future of 
Work Programme (see Baldry et al, 2007) and recently completed a three-year term as 
editor of the leading journal Work, Employment and Society. He assumed the editorship 
of another leading journal, New Technology, Work and Employment in January 2012.  
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1.3   Sources of Data and Literature 
 
The original objective was for the research to be exclusively desk-based. The intention 
was that the author review the relevant secondary literature on Performance Management 
with a particular concentration on the effects on employees.  However, a preliminary 
reading of HRM textbooks (e.g. Armstrong, 2009; Bach, 2005; Beardwell and Claydon, 
2010; Torrington et al, 2002; Torrington et al, 2011) established that the bulk of the 
extant literature was managerially prescriptive and almost entirely failed to consider the 
consequences of Performance Management for workers, let alone suggest that these 
might be negative for employees’ health and well-being.  
 
Insofar as this mainstream HRM literature does reflect upon the condition of workers, it 
depicts Performance Management as being essentially benign, if not wholly beneficial, in 
its effects. As a result, it was deemed necessary to broaden the inquiry; firstly, by 
considering a wider body of literature and, secondly, by undertaking original research. 
Therefore, the report draws upon diverse primary and secondary sources as follows. 
 
1.3.1  Academic Literature 
 
First, an overview of the mainstream HRM literature on Performance Management and 
the limited critical coverage are necessary for contextualizing this study.  
 
Second, the report considers academic research on the important changes occurring over 
the past decades in work organization, management control and the monitoring and 
measurement of output and performance. Work intensification, for example, has attracted 
much attention (e.g. Burchell, 2002; Green, 2001; 2006; McGovern et al, 2007) as has 
lean production and its transposition from manufacturing (e.g. Stewart et al, 2010; 
Womack et al, 1990) to the public sector (e.g. Radnor and Bucci, 2007; Carter et al,  
2011a; 2011b; 2013). Less attention has been paid to related issues, notably sickness 
absence management (e.g. Taylor et al, 2010), despite their significance for the daily 
experience of work.  
 
Third, it is necessary to reflect on the nature of HRM and the principal changes that have 
occurred in people management and the regulation of the employment relationship (see 
e.g. Thompson, 2012). 
 
In sum, the report draws upon academic knowledge in several areas in order to 
contextualise this study; on performance management itself (both mainstream and 
critical), on diverse aspects of the changed organization of work, and on HRM and 
regulation in the employment relationship  
 
1.3.2  Reports and Statistics  
 
Significant material, in the form of official reports, government statistics and other 
documentary and survey data, is also considered. These additional sources are important 
6 
 
for contextualising the study particularly, it is argued, in relation to work-related mental 
ill-health.  
 
1.3.3 Primary Research – Interview Evidence 
 
Directly addressing the problem of the paucity of evidence of contemporary 
developments in Performance Management and their effects on employees, primary 
research was undertaken in the form of interviews with trade union respondents in the 
financial services and telecommunications sectors. As indicated, it was delegates from 
trade unions in these sectors (Communication Workers Union and Unite the Union 
[Finance Sector]) who had proposed the resolution on Performance Management at the 
STUC Conference.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with national and regional Full Time Officers 
(FTOs), seconded representatives and workplace reps and branch officers of both unions. 
In addition, at union conferences and seminars at which the author attended or 
participated, discussions focusing on Performance Management were recorded and 
transcribed.  
 
Given the acknowledged importance of gender, additional interviews were conducted 
with members of the STUC Women’s Committee. In order to gain additional insight into 
Performance Management practices, particularly as they affected vulnerable, non-
unionised workers, an interview was conducted with the Director of an Employment 
Advice and Rights Centre.  
 
Finally, a former senior Human Resource Manager of a major telecoms company gave an 
extended interview which detailed their experience of Performance Management and how 
it had been implemented. The contact details of this individual were given to the author 
by a CWU official. The interviewee had expressed their willingness to give a candid 
interview on Performance Management as they had been strongly opposed on ethical 
grounds to the practices they were being expected to implement. So strong was this 
individual’s opposition to Performance Management that it had prompted their decision 
to resign their position with the company.  
 
1.3.4 Primary Research – Company Documentation 
 
Union respondents provided the author with comprehensive company documentation on 
Performance Management covering the period 2009-2012. In total, documentation was 
analysed for five banks, three insurance companies and two telecommunications 
organisations.  
 
1.3.5 Summary and Structure 
 
The outcome is a major report that synthesises extensive primary evidence and secondary 
data and extends far beyond the original, limited remit. The report is structured as 
follows.  
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Section 2 summarises the study’s aims and objectives.  
 
Section 3 detail the sources of primary evidence.  
 
Section 4 provides a summary of Perfromance Management as it is considered within the 
‘mainstream’ Human Resource Management academic literature. 
 
Section 5 discusses the critical academic literature on Performance Management. 
 
Section 6 reveiws some of the main elements in the changed contexts of work 
organization and the management of the employment relationship. 
 
Section 7 is the heart of the report, documenting the impact and worker experiences of 
Performance Management on the workplace ‘front line’. Evidence from union interviews, 
conferences and seminars is combined with that from company documentation.  
 
Section 8 reports on union responses to Performance Management.   
 
Section 9 considers the condition of Performance Management on more vulnerable 
workers in non-unionised workplaces. 
 
Section 10 consists of an evaluative conclusion, which is followed by an Appendix and a 
full list of references 
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2 Aims and Objectives of Report 
 
The report’s aims and objectives derive from the concerns of the STUC resolution and 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
 To provide an understanding of the mainstream textbook HRM literature on 
Performance Management.  
 
 To consider the critical academic literature on Performance Management. 
 
 To evaluate the principal changes that have occurred in the organization of 
work, management control and HRM practice that provide the context for 
emerging forms of Performance Management.   
 
 To consider the academic evidence on the growth in intensification of work, 
workload and job strain in recent years, aspects of the work conditions that 
might impact on workers’ experiences of mental ill-health.  
 
 To summarise and evaluate the statistical evidence on the extent of 
occupationally related mental ill-health. 
 
 To present primary data on Performance Management from interviews 
conducted with union officers and representatives, from union seminars and 
conferences, where these respondents report on the effects of Performance 
Management on workers. 
 
 To analysis this primary evidence in relation to the STUC resolution regarding 
Performance Management, including the specific claims that Performance 
Management excessively pressurises workers into producing more, that it 
establishes quotas for underperformers and that it is causing the ‘managed 
exit’ of employees. 
 
 To investigate the particular claim that workers subjected to Performance 
Management are increasingly experiencing mental ill-health and that 
Performance Management is leading to increased sickness absence.  
 
 To consider the potential significance of a gendered experience to any 
negative effects for employees of Performance Management. 
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3  Data Sources and Research Methods 
 
3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
As indicated, primary research consisted of interviews and documentary evidence. 
Thirty-one interviews were conducted (Table 1) and typically were lasted 1.5 - 2 hours. 
The large majority (24) of these were semi-structured and were with national or regional 
union officers and lay representatives of Unite the Union (Finance Sector) or the 
Communication Workers Union. In order to provide additional evidence into the 
potentially important gendered effects, five members of the STUC’s Women’s 
Committee were interviewed, four of whom were lay reps or branch officers and one who 
was a full-time officer. These interviews gave evidence of sectors, beyond telecoms and 
financial services. Committee members were employed in the voluntary sector, local 
government, the civil service, the rail industry NHS. All of these interviews were 
recorded and transcribed and were then analysed inductively and thematically. 
 
Table 1: Primary Data Sources – Interviews 
Organisation Interviewee Date 
Bank A  National Officer 11 January 2010 
 
Senior Rep 28 January 2010 
 
Workplace Rep 16 May 2011 
 
Senior Rep 4 September 2012 
Bank B  National Officer 12 January 2010 
 
Workplace Rep 17 August 2011 
 
Workplace Rep  6 September 2012 
Bank C  Senior Seconded Rep 4  January 2010 
 
Workplace Rep 22 April 2010 
 
Workplace Rep 4 September 2012 
Bank D Seconded Rep 29 May 2010 
 
Senior Rep  14 May 2012 
Insurance A  Senior Rep  17 September 2010 
Insurance B National Officer 19 September 2010 
Insurance C Senior Rep 15 September 2011 
 
Senior Rep 5 September 2012 
Telecoms Regional Officer 1 13 January 2010 
 
Organiser 18 January 2010 
 
Branch Officer 1 February 2010 
 
National Officer 1 2 February 2010 
 
National Officer 2 2 February 2010 
 
National Officer 3 3 February 2010 
 
National Officer 4 3 February 2010 
 
Branch Secretary 1 24 May 2011 
 
Branch Secretary 2 8 September 2011 
Employment Advice and Rights Centre Director 22 January 2010 
STUC Women’s Committee Regional Officer (Unite) 12 August 2010 
 
Branch Officer (RMT) 12 August 2010 
 
Branch Officer (Unite) 13 August 2010 
 
Branch Officer (PCS) 19 August 2010 
 
Branch Officer (Unison) 26 August 2010 
Telecoms  Ex-HR Manager 3 December 2010 
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For the union interviews a common schedule of questions was utilised (see Appendix 1). 
Respondents were asked, firstly, to reflect on the origins of Performance Management in 
their organisation and when and how they had become of aware of it in their capacity as a 
trade union representative or officer. They were then asked to elaborate on the purposes 
and nature of these initial versions of Performance Management and to consider how the 
content and detail had changed over time. Interviewees were specifically probed at his 
stage for the potential effects of the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
A specific line of inquiry was on the expansion of Performance Management to 
encompass more than Performance Appraisal with which it had been closely associated, 
if not synonymous. The questions then focused on the forms of measurement and 
evaluation implicated in these more developed versions of Performance Management, 
probing for quantitative targets, qualitative monitoring, behaviours, attitudes and so on.  
 
The tensions between Performance Management as a means for determining reward and 
as a means for developing employees or driving improvement were explored. Questions 
then sought to understand more about the ways in which Performance Management has 
become increasingly focused on driving improvements in productivity and quality 
through the implementation of improvement plans named PIPs (Performance 
Improvement Plans) or their equivalents.  
 
The schedule of questions then probed for potential disciplinary consequences of 
underperforming, including involuntary exit. Respondents were asked also about the 
ways in which individuals were banded in categories, the criteria used and so on. Specific 
questions were directed to the issues of forced distribution and, in particular, to the 
operation and effects of the Bell Curve.   
 
The final section focuses on the important area, given the original motion and the 
objectives of the study, of the effects of Performance Management on employees and 
union members. Interviewees were asked this as an open question so that they would 
volunteer responses unprompted and undirected by the author.  Following an initial 
response interviewees were then probed to report on the experiences of their members in 
relation to the consequences of Performance Management, including work intensity, job 
insecurity, mental ill-health (anxiety, stress and depression). Respondents were also 
asked to consider whether these effects were gendered.  
 
Two additional interviews were conducted. The first was with the Director of an 
Employment Advice and Rights Centre. Many, but by no means all, of the ‘clients’ 
presenting at this centre were from non-unionised workplaces and therefore the Director 
was able to provide insight into the experiences of workers facing Performance 
Management in these environments. The second was with a former Human Resource 
Manager of a Telecoms company. This senior manager had recently resigned their 
position largely because of opposition to Performance Management practices and the 
impact on employees.  
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3.2 Union Conference and Seminars 
 
An additional and complementary source of data came from union conferences, seminars 
and meetings attended by the author between 2009 and 2012 (Table 2). There were 
twenty-one of these in total and Performance Management was an important, and 
sometimes a single, agenda item. At each, the author delivered a presentation on the 
subject as a preliminary to a discussion by delegates/participants. At the national union 
conferences indicated, motions on Performance Management were proposed, debated and 
decided upon. In six cases the proceedings were recorded and transcribed. At the 
remainder, the author took handwritten notes which were typed up shortly thereafter.  
 
For the most part, the report make general references to (as opposed to specific citations 
from) the evidence of these meetings and contributions made by delegates. However, the 
content of the very many contributions made by union reps, delegates and ordinary 
members confirmed in every respect the evidence from the semi-structured interviews.  
 
Table 2: Union Seminars and Conferences 
Union/Company Event Date 
Unite the Union    
 
Change at Work Seminar 3-7 Sep. 2012 
 
National Finance Sector Conference, Brighton 1 Dec. 2011 
 
Finance Sector, Change at Work Seminar, Eastbourne 17 May 2011 
 
Unite National Industrial Committee – Finance Sector, London 8 March 2011 
 
Regional Finance and Legal Committee, Glasgow 3 Sep 2010 
 
National Reps Meeting, Wortley Hall 29 June 2009 
Bank A National Reps Seminar, Eastbourne 30 May 2012 
 
National Reps Conference, Eastbourne  16 Nov. 2011 
 
National Reps Conference, Manchester 1 Oct. 2010 
Bank B National Reps Meeting, Glasgow 9 Sept. 2009 
 
National Reps Meeting, Glasgow 1 Oct. 2010 
Bank C Global Conference, Glasgow, 13 May 2011 
 
National Reps Conference, Glasgow 14 Sep. 2010 
 
National Committee, Glasgow 20 January 2010 
Insurance A Biennial National Reps Conference, Blackpool 11 Oct. 2011 
CWU   
 
Members Meeting, Swansea 8 Sep. 2011 
 
National Conference, Bournemouth 24 May 2011 
 
National Conference, Bournemouth  25 May 2010 
 
National Activists Meeting, Manchester 27 March 2010 
 
Telecoms Executive, London 2 Feb 2010 
Unison Glasgow City Council Branch Seminar, Glasgow 18 Nov. 2011 
 
3.3  Company Documentation 
 
Company documentation has provided another important complementary data source. As 
indicated above, relevant and extensive documentation was provided by union sources for 
five banks, three insurance firms and two telecommunications companies. Documents 
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included guidelines on Performance Management for employees, for managers and team 
leaders, pro forma schedules and progress reports and other related HR papers. In most 
cases, more than one version of documents were made available to the author, reflecting 
the changes introduced during the course of the research period. Typically, the author 
acquired documentation for the years 2008-9 and also for the years 2010-11.  
 
Of course, it is necessary to interpret this documentation critically for the obvious reason 
that the practice can diverge significantly from written policy prescription. The rhetoric 
can indeed depart from the reality. In fact, as far as the evidence from the trade union 
respondents is concerned this was indeed the case. Concretely, Performance Management 
and its component stages might be presented in benign terms, but in practice management 
might implement procedures in a punitive manner. Nevertheless, a reading of the 
documents reveals that formal policy and procedure did change across the research 
period, so that by the end of 2011 policies were more prescriptive in terms of detail, 
tighter in terms of timescales for personal improvement and more stringent in terms of 
penalties (including exit) for continued ‘underperformance’.  
 
3.4 Limitations and Strengths of the Study 
 
This current study breaks new ground in that it reveals the impact of Performance 
Management and the experiences of workers on the front line of organizational life. 
Extensive primary research was undertaken over a three year period focusing largely, but 
not exclusively, on the financial services and telecommunications sectors.  
 
The study depended on a layer of key informants.  In this study, union respondents were 
the ‘mechanism experts’, to use Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) term, capable of explicating 
the phenomena of Performance Management. Indeed, the roles played by these diverse 
union actors (full-time national and regional officers, seconded reps,  branch officers, 
workplace reps) enabled them to convey, in different ways, the experiences of a broad 
population of employees, who are both union members and non-members.  
 
The workplace representatives, whose contributions were made at the union meetings, 
seminars and conferences, occupy a unique position within the social relations of 
production. They are both observers of managerial initiatives but, more importantly, 
participants as representatives, highly attuned to the concerns and demands of their 
members and, frequently, their non-member fellow workers. As Danford et al (2003: 
164) argue, workplace reps ‘reflect the dynamic of change within the heartbeat of the 
union movement’, providing alternative perspectives to those of employer sources or 
even full-time union officers. Thus, reps and lay branch officers, provided valuable, 
first-hand insight into worker experiences of Performance Management at the interface 
between the workfoce and management, articulating and transmitting the concerns of the 
former with the latter.  
 
In Unite the Union (finance sector) and the Communication Workers Union, both full-
time officers and seconded reps should be considered ‘mechanism experts’ of a different 
kind. Although not exposed to the day-to-day realities of Performance Management, 
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they are responsible for negotiating with their respective companies, pursuing the issues 
and progressing the grievances that have been raised by members through the union 
structures and at conferences. All of FTOs and national based seconded reps interviewed 
had experience of being consulted by, or negotiating with, the companies for which they 
are responsible on Performance Management and its consequences.  
 
One final strength of the research should be emphasised. The evidential basis is certainly 
extensive, given the constraints of resource and access, not merely in terms of the 
number of interviews but also the breadth and depth of testimony from the union 
meetings. Combining interview and meeting evidence and considering also the 
documentary sources constitutes a limited form of triangulation. Triangulation has been 
defined as ‘a method of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for 
regularities in the research data’ (O'Donoghue and Punch, 2003: 78). The use of the 
qualifier ’limited’ is justified, though, since as has been noted the research did not 
include a conventional questionnaire/survey instrument. Often triangulation does 
involve combining quantitative with qualitative data (see Olson, 2004). On the positive 
side, however, there is no question that this data does generate the identifiable 
‘regularities’ that are a criterion for the robustness of method. 
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4 Mainstream HRM Perspectives of Performance Management 
 
4.1 Principles of Performance Management 
 
The mainstream HRM literature claims that Performance Management is a systematic 
process for improving organisational effectiveness through developing the performance 
of teams, but most importantly that of individual workers. The fundamental concern of 
Performance Management is universally held to be the alignment of individual 
employees with organisational objectives. However, it is argued, this alignment is not to 
be imposed in a directive, top-down manner. As one of the most widely-read HRM 
textbook states, Performance Management is a means of getting better results ‘by 
understanding and managing performance within an agreed framework of planned goals, 
standards and competency requirements’ (Armstrong, 2009: 618). A widely-held 
definition of Performance Management is as,  
 
A process for establishing a shared understanding about what is to be achieved 
and how it is to be achieved and an approach to managing people that increases 
the probability of achieving success. (Weiss and Harte, 1997) 
 
The critical words in this narrative are ‘agreed’ and ‘shared’. The philosophy 
underpinning this mainstream perspective of Performance Management is of a mutuality 
of interest between employers and employees which assumes the voluntary nature of the 
agreement between the respective parties in the employment relationship.  (Torrington et 
al, 2011)1. Armstrong (2009: 628) elaborates the concerns of PM as, 
 
• enabling expectations to be defined and agreed in terms of the role 
responsibilities and accountabilities (expected to do), skills (expected to have) 
and behaviours (expected to be) [and] 
 
• providing opportunities for individuals to identify their own goals and develop 
their skills and competencies  
 
This assumption of mutuality, consensus and shared decision making recurs throughout 
the HRM texts. Torrington et al (2011: 269) articulate this developmental interpretation 
when they state that ‘a view is emerging of performance management which centres on 
“dialogue”, “shared understanding”, “agreement” and “mutual commitment”’(see also 
Armstrongh and Baron, 1998; 2004; 2005). Indeed, it is argued, as opposed to ‘top down’ 
practices that might hitherto have been associated with performance appraisal, 
organisations are now increasingly emphasising that employees should take greater 
ownership of their performance management.  
 
These assumptions are reflected in virtually all of the company documentation reviewed 
in this study. 
                                                 
1
 It is notable that these HRM texts make no reference to the participation of trade unions in these 
‘voluntary’ arrangements. The underlying assumption is individualistic, of a tacit agreement between 
individual employees and the employing organisation. 
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4.2 The Performance Cycle 
 
Underlying the Performance Management process is the Performance Cycle (Diagram 1) 
paradigm, a virtuous circle which interconnects the three stages - planning performance, 
supporting performance and reviewing performance. 
 
Diagram 1: The Performance Cycle 
 
 
 
With regards to planning performance, the HRM texts emphasise the importance of a 
shared view of expected performance between manager and employee, which may be 
expressed, variously, in the traditional job description, key accountabilities, targets and 
essential competencies. Although the cycle is presented as beginning with a discrete 
planning meeting, that establishes clear goals and expectations for the forthcoming 
period, the literature acknowledges that it may follow directly on from, or even be part of, 
the review meeting that completes the cycle.  
 
Box 1: Advantages of Performance Management 
The main value of Performance Management is to:- 
 communicate a shared vision of the purpose and values of the organisation 
 
 define the expectations of what must be delivered and how it should be delivered 
 
 ensure that people are aware of what constitutes high performance and how they 
need to achieve it 
 
 enhance motivation, engagement and commitment by providing a means of 
recognising endeavour and achievement through feedback 
 
 enable people to monitor their own performance and encourage dialogue about 
what needs to be done to improve importance 
            Source: Armstrong and Baron (2005) 
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Therefore, the process should be seen as continuous rather than a series of discrete events 
and activities. The ‘critical’ point, according to Torrington et al (2002: 297), is that 
simply handing out a job description and a list of objectives or targets to employees is not 
adequate, and that performance expectations need to be understood and, where possible, 
‘involve a contribution from the employee’. Employee input, it is maintained, is key both 
to ensuring that any barriers to achieving objectives can be overcome and to evaluating 
whether an individual employee’s objectives and targets are achievable. Indeed, the 
literature stresses line managers’ commitment to planning the training, development and 
resources required for employees to meet their objectives.  
 
In describing the supporting performance phase, the prescriptive literature reinforces 
the theme of Performance Management as a developmental process. In this account, the 
line manager is seen as the ‘key enabler’. The diverse supporting and facilitating roles 
that the manager should adopt include: organising the resources for support; ensuring that 
off-line training is provided and takes place; revising performance targets if barriers make 
them unachievable; providing constructive and continuous feedback; providing practical 
job experiences to enhance critical skills; identifying information sources and other 
people who may assist an employee’s development.  
 
Although these versions of Performance Management insist that it is the employee’s 
responsibility to achieve the agreed objectives, the manager, who must always be 
accessible for the employee, ‘has a continuous role in providing support and guidance, 
and in oiling the organisational wheels’ (Torrington et al, 2002: 298).  Providing the 
basis for self-development means that line managers must ensure that ‘the support and 
guidance people need to develop is readily available’ (Armstrong, 2009: 619).  
 
Reviewing performance is obviously a critical phase in the performance cycle and more 
detailed consideration will be given below to performance appraisal. It should be noted at 
this point that appraisal should be regarded as only one phase in the contemporary 
performance cycle but, historically, performance appraisal was often regarded as 
synonymous with Performance Management. Furthermore, appraisal should be seen as 
both culminating and dominating the cycle.  
 
Consistent with the developmental ethos permeating the other two phases of the 
performance cycle, the HRM literature in general terms places the emphasis upon 
employees themselves for undertaking at least part of their own review on an ongoing 
basis ‘in order to plan their work and priorities and also to highlight to the manager well 
in advance if the agreed performance will not be delivered by the agreed dates’ 
(Torrington, 2002: 299).     
 
4.3  Performance Appraisal  
 
Appraisal systems formalise the review stage of the performance cycle. Invariably, 
appraisal systems were devised at the centre of organisations, typically by the HR 
function, and require line managers to conduct appraisals of the members of staff for 
whom they are responsible. The frequency with which appraisals are implemented varies. 
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Historically, the annual appraisal was most common, but over the time the intervals been 
appraisals for many employees have shortened, so that every six months or quarterly 
reviews have become more common. Wolff (2008) found that while an anuual review 
was still the most common, with 44 per cent of respondents reporting this frequency, the 
proportion of organisations reporting twice-yearly reviews has grown to 39 per cent. 
 
The evidence is also clear that appraisal has expanded to include ever wider groups of 
employees, from its initial evaluation of management and supervisory grades to 
increasingly being used for clerical and administrative staff and, subsequently, for 
manual grades. The 1998 WERS study (Cully et al, 1999) provides evidence of the trend; 
managers (70 per cent), professional workers (96 per cent) and sales staff (64 per cent) 
were the occupations most covered by formal appraisal. By this survey, more than half of 
clerical and craft occupations were subject to performance appraisals (Cully et al, 1999: 
72) 
 
The scope and method of appraisal varies between organisations, with the principal 
difference regarded as lying between qualitative and quantitative forms  (Beardwell and 
Claydon, 2010). Qualitative forms are based upon a text based or narrative account, while 
quantitative forms rely upon a straight (numerical or alpha-numerical) ranking of 
performance against predefined criteria. Whatever combinations of criteria are implicated 
in the performance review and appraisal, they invariably have the outcome of ranking - or 
rating - individual employee performance.  
 
The justification for using such ratings rests upon several arguments. First, it is held that 
appraisal ratings compels managers to formalise evaluations of employee performance 
rather than relying compeletely on managers’ subjective views. According to this view, 
managers can be held to account for ratings given and justify them if required. Second, 
summary judgements enable managers to identify ‘who are the exceptional performers or 
under-performers and who are the reliable core performers so that action can be taken 
(developmental or some form of reward)’ (Armstrong, 2009: 629).2  
 
Third, it is argued, it is impossible to operate a performance related pay system without 
ratings. A method has to be in place to ensure that the amount of an award is 
commenurate with the level of performance. Fourth, a common supposition is that ratings 
can motivate employees to improve their performance, especially when they are related 
to reward. It is worth noting, again, that the rationale is positive, developmental and 
emphasises reward, and does not suggest that a negativity, such as the avoidance of a 
poor rating and its consequences, is a dominating characteristic.  
 
The number and the titles of the rating scales used differ between organisations and can 
be defined in alphabetical (A, B, C etc.) or numerical (1, 2, 3  etc.) terms, or even by 
initials, such as ‘ex’ for excellent, or ‘vg’ for very good. The latter may be an attempt to 
                                                 
2
 In passing, it should be noted that the action specified here is developmental, or motivated by 
consideration of financial reward. Neither here, nor generally in the textbooks is it suggested that the 
purpose of such ratings is to concentrate on those achieving scores in the lowest band or bands and 
therefore is designed to punish underperformers. 
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conceal the hierarchical nature of the scale employed. The numeric or alphabetical scales 
may also have an adjective attached to them, such as a for excellent, b for very good and 
so on. Alternatively, or more commonly, scales may be accompanied by descriptors 
which specify the level of performance commensurate with the scale. Various examples 
are given in the textbooks. The case presented in Box 2 can be regarded as fairly 
representative of the ideal-type depicted.  
 
    Box 2: Typical descriptors of performance appraisal rating scales  
 
• Exceptional performance: Exceeds expectations and consistently makes 
an outstanding contribution that significantly extends the impact and 
influence of the role. 
 
• Well-balanced performance: Meets objectives and requirements of the 
role; consistently performs in a thoroughly proficient manner. 
 
• Barely effective performance: Does not meet all objectives or 
requirements of the role; significant performance improvements are 
needed. 
 
• Unacceptable performance: Fails to meet most objectives or 
requirements of the role; shows a lack of commitment to performance 
improvement, or a lack of ability, which has been discussed prior to 
performance review.  
 
The overall use of scales has grown considerably since the 1990s. For example, by 2005  
a survey of Performance Management found that as many as 70 per cent of organisation 
respondents utilised them (e-reward, 2005). The same survey also found that the most 
common number of levels or categories was 5, as reported by 43 per cent of respondents. 
The primary evidence reported below, largely from financial sector organisations, 
confirms the extensive use of five rankings.  
 
Performance Appraisal traditionally was a relatively straightforward process in which a 
line manager would meet on an annual basis to review the performance of their 
subordinates. Forms would be completed, often in perfunctory manner, and little would 
happen until the process was completed the following year (Bach, 2005: 289). Some 
authors have referred to the annual ritual of performance appraisal and noted its limited 
organisational impact. Indeed, Armstong and Murlis (1998) asserted that performance 
appraisal too often had degenerated into a ‘dishonest annual ritual’. There is no question 
that appraisal has become increasingly integrated into more comprehensive performance 
management programmes, in comparison to the often perfunctory practice of the past.  
 
As summarised below (Section 5), a body of critical evidence has demonstrated how 
Performance Appraisal can lead to distorted rankings of individual employees. In 
response, organisations have intensified training for team leaders in how to recognise bias 
and overcome it (Bach, 2005: 304). Other methods aimed at minimising the problems of 
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bias and subjectivity have been adopted. First, the method that was most fashionable for a 
period was the ‘balanced scorecard’, by which individuals were monitored and evaluated 
on the degree of achievement as deemed consistent with an organisation’s strategic goals 
(see e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1996). The idea is that scores provided by multiple 
stakeholders within an organisation provide an holistic evaluation of performance, 
correcting any dependence on unreliable scores that might be delivered by a singular 
appraiser or a sole source of information.  
 
The popularity of a second initiative, the 360-degree appraisal, has similarly waxed and 
waned (Newbold, 2008), although its use until recently had became relatively widespread 
(Aswathappa, 2005). Self-assessment is an indispensable element in 360-degree 
appraisal, but performance data is canvassed from a wide range of stakeholders; peers, 
subordinates, superiors and additional nominated agents both internal and external to the 
organisation.  
 
Irrespective of the specific form adopted, appraisal was responsible in the 1990s for 
increasing numbers of employees having a proportion of their salaries determined by 
Performance Related Pay (PRP)3. Thereafter, however, PRP declined in significance as a 
feature of performance management systems as the focus on developmental needs 
appeared to grow commensurately. Armstrong and Baron (2005: 68) found that PRP was 
a feature of only 31 per cent of performance management systems in 2004 compared to 
43 per cent in 1998.  
 
However, while the evidence seems quite categorical in this respect, some other ‘trends’ 
that were observable up to a decade ago may now be open to question. For example, 
Armstrong and Baron (2005: 58) found that the use of ratings had continued to fall since 
1998, and were undertaken by only 49 per cent of organisations by 2004. It will be 
interesting to see what the recent primary evidence (Sections 7-9) from the financial 
services, telecoms and other sectors tells us about the extent to which ratings are being 
used.  
 
A detailed discussion of Performance Related Pay lies beyond the scope of this report. 
However, research has been mixed in respect of whether PRP actually does improve 
organisational performance. The broader debate is whether HRM policies and practoces 
actually do lead to improvements in performance and, while an association has been 
confirmed between more extensive use of HR and various indicators of organisational 
performance, the associations are often modest and isssues of causation left unanswered 
(Guest and Conway, 2011). Moreover, studies have shown that neither individual pay nor 
group performance pay are related to motivation or job satisfaction (Wood and de 
Menezes, 2011). If PRP as a related outcome of appraisal is not obviously beneficial in 
the manner that many claimed for, its purpose may be found elsewhere. Indeed the 
primary function, as Marsden (2004) has argued in relation to the public sector, has been 
to provide the framework for the renegotiation of performance standards, that is to 
                                                 
3
 Bach (2005: 296-7) makes the point that it would be mistaken to see the growth of performance appraisal 
as resulting from the extension of PRP in the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, the main purpose of appraisal 
schemes has been influenced by the dominant issues in personnel management practice.  
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changing the terms of the effort bargain and to intensify work, a conclusion that may 
resonate with the evidence presented below on the effects of Performance Management.  
 
4.4  Underperformance  
 
As the textbooks emphasise, a significant puropse underlying such evaluations is that 
organisations can drive continuous performance improvement. Yet again the textbooks 
present an essentially developmental perspective. Armstrong (2004: 634) emphasises that 
the aim ‘should be the positive one of maximising high performance’ although he 
conceded that this does involve taking steps to deal with under-performance. 
Nevertheless, such steps should be constructive and supportive. Handy’s (1989) advice 
that managing underperformance should be about ‘applauding success and forgiving 
failure’ is invoked. Mistakes, it is argued, should be used as an opportunity for learning. 
Risher (2003) is quoted to the effect that, 
 
Poor performance is best seen as a problem in which the employer and 
management are both accountable. In fact, one can argue that it is unlikely to 
emerge if people are effectively managed.  
 
The received wisdom is that managing underperformers not only should be but, in fact, is 
a ‘positive process that is based on feedback throughout the year and looks forward to 
what can be done by individuals to overcome performance problems and, importantly, 
how managers can provide support and help’ (Armstrong, 2009: 634). This author then 
lays out the five basic steps required to manage underperformance: identify and agree the 
problem; establish the reason(s) for the shortfall; decide and agree on the action required; 
resource the action; and monitor and provide feedback.  
 
Throughout this account and the bulk of the passages in other textbooks devoted to 
dealing with underperformance, the emphasis is on mutual agreement, identification of 
causes beyond the employee’s control, mutually agreed improvement steps, support and 
continuous feedback. It is helpful to quote the text accompanying the heading, ‘Resource 
the action’ for it exemplies as well as anything the normastive assumptions of 
developmentalism that underpin the textbook prescriptions of dealing with 
underperformance. The exact form of words is: ‘Provide the coaching, training, guidance, 
experience or facilities required to enable agreed actions to happen’ (Armstrong, 2009: 
635). As demonstrated in Section 7, an organisational focus on underperformance, in 
practice, has often been disciplinary in intent, yet it is difficult to discern such an 
objective from the HRM literature.  
 
4.5 Evolution of Performance Management 
 
It is important to recognise, though, that contemporary versions of Performance 
Management have evolved far beyond the ritualistic occurrence of the annual 
Performance Appraisal. Performance Appraisal can no longer be regarded as 
synonymous with Performance Management, as was frequently the case during the 1990s 
and even well into the 2000s. Appraisal is now far more integrated into all-encompassing 
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systems of Performance Management, an evolution that has massive consequences for 
both individuals and the organisations they work for.  
 
It is suggested that observers have often misunderstood the nature of the transformation 
that has taken place. Some confusion derives  from the fact that actual practice has 
changed signficiantly, even though the rhetoric and terminology surrounding 
performance management remain largely unchanged, redolent of an earlier and more 
employee sympathetic version of Performance Management. For organisations, it can be 
suggested that the rhetorical claims and normative assumptions of these earlier iterations 
have faded, to be replaced with more robust and rigorous processes in practice. It is like 
the smile on the face of the Cheshire cat, all that remains is the image.  
 
The revised Performance Management cycle, presented in Diagram 2, is tighter and more 
prescriptive. Perhaps the most marked contrast with the earlier and ‘looser’ cycle 
(Diagram 1) is to be seen in the change from the rhetorically developmental ‘Supporting 
Performance’ circle, which is now articulated as ‘Managing Performance Throughout the 
Year’. The latter represents a significant shift from the episodic nature of previous annual 
appraisals and developmental support to more robust and continuous managerial control. 
As emphasised by Armstrong and Baron (2005: 15), this renewed version of Performance 
Management is a process more than an event and operates in a continuous cycle. For 
these authors Performance Management has become, 
 
a strategy which relates to every activity of the organisation set in the context of 
its human respource policies, culture, style, and communication systems (ibid:16)     
 
Diagram 2: The ‘Evolved’ Performance Management Cycle 
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Performance Management has thus expanded in scope and reach and now aims to knit 
together individual goals, departmental purpose and organisational objectives. It now 
incorporates issues that are central to many other elements of HRM, from recruitment, 
induction, training and development, reward management, through to capability 
procedures and termination (Boxall and Purcell, 2008: 171-2). Indeed, Marchington and 
Wilkinson (2008: 262) maintain that, for some, performance management has become 
synonymous with the totality of day-to-day management activity because it is concerned 
with how work can be organised in order to achieve the best possible results.  
 
The extent to which  these ‘holistic’ Performance Management initiatives now operate is 
remarkable. In the most recent comprehensive CIPD survey, 87 per cent of respondents 
were found to operate a formal Performance Management process, having risen from 69 
per cent (Armstong and Baron, 1998; 2005) with a further 65 per cent of the remainder 
stating their intention to introduce such a programme in the next two years. Apropos the 
previous discussion on the spread of Performance Management from managerial, 
supervisory and professional grades to wider layers of the workforce, it should be noted 
that Performance Management has now extended far beyond these higher layers to 
embrace technical grades, white-collar workers generally and, latterly, manual grades.  
 
It is acknowledged that Performance Management is now bound up with organisation-
wide targets and KPIs and not just in the private sector. Under the new Labour 
administrations of 1997-2010 central government targets and the drive for best value 
ensured that a strong interest in Performance Management permeated the public sector 
(Bach, 2004). Invariably, KPIs and targets cascade down through business unit, centre or 
facility and then to the team and are finally disaggregated to employee level in the form 
of individual balanced scorecards, a plethora of quantitative metrics and qualitative 
evaluations of performance (Torrington et al, 2011: 264). Some mainstream academics 
have recognised that these  ‘new’ forms of Performance Management, focused on the 
continuous improvement of employee performance, might involve a harder managerial 
practice (see e.g. Houldsworth, 2004). Yet, the HRM literature regards this development  
negatively, suggesting that it is an aberration, an ill-conceived departure from authentic 
Performance Management as part of HRM best practice. These accounts advocate the 
softer developmental and motivational approaches to aligning the individual and the 
organisation, which are universally regarded as epitomising good management practice. 
 
Insofar as the interests of employees are considered, it is assumed, without recourse to 
empirical evidence, that Performance Management is actually beneficial and certainly not 
detrimental for them.  It is held that those employees who do not meet the required 
standards will be managed ‘fairly’ and given the support required to do so. 
 
Even authors normally critical of new management techniques portray Performance 
Management positively. Harley et al (2010: 745) argues that because it generally 
involves measurement of performance against targets, it should ‘provide employees with 
a clear set of expectations as well as with feedback on performance, thereby increasing 
predictability and order’. Furthermore, this study purports to demonstrate that 
performance management was ‘positively associated with commitment and satisfaction 
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and negatively associated with emotional exhaustion, suggesting that the more an 
employee was subject to performance management the more positive was her/his 
experience of work’ (ibid: 750). The regular interventions between supervisors and 
workers that Performance Management necessitates has the ‘effect of providing support’, 
making employees aware of their performance on an ongoing basis [and] lowering stress 
associated with uncertainty’ (ibid: 753).  
 
In sum, Performance Management has evolved significantly over the last two decades, 
becoming an all-embracing management practice or set of practices, and not the limited 
stand-alone appraisal with which it was often synonymous. Advocates of Performance 
Management, thus, now contrast the strategic approach of the cycle of integrated 
activities, with the discrete free-standing appraisal. It has also included within its scope 
ever-growing numbers of employees. Despite critical commentary, summarised below, 
that has highlighted the limitations of Performance Management’s purpose, design and 
implementation, and despite a minority trend which has presented a more trenchant moral 
and philosophical critique, the dominant perspective continues to stress the positive and 
developemental aspects of Performance Management. A good example of the enduring 
optimism with which Performance Management is associated comes from a recent 
edition of a popular HRM text.   
 
This emerging perspective on performance management continues the shift from 
prescriptive, audit- and compliance-based oversight to an ongoing, forward-looking 
strategic partnership...[and looking ahead] the management of performance will 
increasingly become an organisation focused rather than an individual-focused 
activity. The ability to demonstrate an active engagement with the corporate social 
responsibility agenda is growing rapidly. Perhaps therefore, in the future, 
performance management will be less about quantifying the output of individual 
employees and more about the effective performance of the organisation in society 
(Beardwell and Claydon, 2010: 485). 
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5 Critical Academic Commentary on Performance Management 
 
The question of whether HRM practices, including Performance Management, do 
actually lead to improved organizational performance has been much debated. Legge 
(1995) has been a foremost critic of the automatic assumption that there is a direct 
relationship between HRM and organizational success. Hall (2004) has argued that the 
evidence of academic studies that purport to demonstrate such a causal link is often 
questionable and the methodologies used are frequently flawed.  
 
Notwithstanding the generally optimistic and developmental tenor of the bulk of the 
prescriptive HRM literature on Performance Management, there has been growing 
discomfort in some academic and practitioner work regarding the measurement of 
performance through the use of appraisal indicators and targets (Beardwell and Claydon, 
2010: 470).  Callahan (2007), amongst others, has argued that Performance Management 
and performance appraisal are inherently compromised because they are used for diverse 
and often conflicting purposes.  
 
Most notably, line managers, who are the key protagonists in Performance Management 
systems and in undertaking appraisals, invariably judge and evaluate the performance of 
employees. However, this role sits uneasily, or may even directly clash, with a line 
manager’s responsibility to motivate and develop those same employees. Furthermore, 
the line manager’s role as counsellor is self-evidently compromised by the fact that an 
employee is unlikely to be willing to confess their limitations and development needs, 
when to do so could adversely affect their rating at their next performance review 
(Newton and Findlay, 1996). This reluctance to ‘betray a weakness’ is more likely to 
happen when, as commonly occurs, a particular performance rating is tied to monetary 
reward.  
 
Some of the literature suggests that line managers might not complete evaluations with 
the candour that is regarded as a pre-requisite for successful Performance Management. 
Appraisers may hesitate to give individual employees a poor review. To do so might be to 
demotivate employees or create unwelcome conflict or personal antagonism. 
Furthermore, giving consistently low scores for employees in their charge might leave 
line managers vulnerable to the charge that the problem does not lie so much with these 
sub-optimal employees, but with their own inability to generate high performance. The 
aptitude of the line managers would then become the subject of senior management 
scrutiny.  
 
Authors highlight additional potential sources of bias bound up with the rating process, 
particularly when remuneration is tied to the outcome of scores. A ‘halo effect’ can occur 
when managers overlook problematic aspects of an employee’s performance that might 
require development and for various reasons, including personal preferences and 
prejudices, they may apply a light touch. A ‘comparing employees’ effect can occur 
when a manager contrasts the performance of an employee against another without 
considering the different (more or less challenging) tasks that they are required to 
perform (Beardwell and Claydon, 2010: 470).  
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Then there is the ‘recency effect’, when managers compile rankings on the basis of their 
most recent encounter with employees or most recent knowledge of their performance. 
Finally, there is the ‘central tendency’ effect when managers are reluctant to be overly 
lenient or harsh in their ratings, irrespective of the actual level of performance. Line 
managers may take the ‘playing it safe’ option, allocating similar rankings to all in a team 
in order to avoid conflict. On the basis of primary research, Geddes and Konrad (2003) 
and Thornton and Rupp (2007) concluded that appraisal ratings are also influenced by 
gender, ethnic origins and physical appearance and subjective perceptions of 
attractiveness.    
 
Underpinning the potential for bias is the obvious concern that employee ratings are 
based on pseudo-scientific criteria and are arbitrary, dependent ultimately on the 
predispositions or even prejudices of the managers conducting reviews and appraisals. 
The problem of subjectivity manifests itself in different ways, especially the difficulty of 
constructing consistent and comparative evaluations between different line managers. 
Achieving ‘objectivity’ is held to be notoriously difficult when the notion of 
‘performance’ is itself unclear. Moreover, to sum up the total performance contribution of 
an individual with a single rating is a gross over-simplification of what may be a complex 
set of factors that influence that performance (Armstrong, 2009: 630) and which may 
well lie beyond the ability of the individual or, for that matter a line manager, to 
influence. Further, for a line manager to then decide on a single rating after what should 
have been a detailed discussion of strengths and weaknesses, suggests that the rating will 
be a superficial and arbitrary judgement.  
 
Organizations continue to make efforts to construct ‘objective’ criteria and use reliability 
measures in comparative metrics, but arguably these cannot wholly overcome the 
problem of intrinsic subjectivity. Of course, as the HRM textbooks advocate, line 
managers can be trained in ‘consistency workshops’ which build a common 
understanding of the level of employee achievement commensurate with a specific rating 
level. However, the growing trend has been for organisations to introduce forms of 
‘calibration’ or ‘moderation’, where managers meet to review the pattern of each other’s 
ratings and challenge anomalous distributions.  
 
In much of the HRM literature, it is claimed that these normalisation and standardisation 
practices are capable of delivering more equitable outcomes, ratings  more genuinely 
reflective of actual employees’ performance. Before examining the primary evidence 
some important questions need to posed, that suggest a quite different outcome. Instead 
of delivering ‘fairness’ and ‘equivalence’, what if this process has the objective of 
preventing rating inflation, of ensuring that a cap is put on the proportion of employees 
who are received above average or excellent scores? What if the ancillary purpose is to 
prevent any individual line manager from awarding an excessive number of high scores? 
What if this process is designed to make certain a correspondence with an a priori fixed 
distribution (see below) as determined by senior management? Such a distribution might 
be a necessary consequence of an organisation making a fixed ‘pot’ of money available 
for performance related awards. Over-generous rating by line managers becomes, then, a 
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major problem for the organisation, in the context of top-down imperatives which 
precludes scores (or at least a proportion of them) being genuinely reflective of 
performance at the higher end. Put simply, it is not permissible for there to be too many 
high scores on the grounds of cost.  
 
Different types of scale have been adopted but one particular form is that of forced 
distribution, where managers are required to conform to prescribed distribution of ratings 
between different levels. This pattern may correspond to the normal curve of distribution 
that has been observed to apply to IQ scoring (Armstrong, 2009: 632). A typical ‘normal’ 
distribution of ratings might be as follows; 10 per cent of employees might be categorised 
as underperformers, a further 15 per cent as failing to meet expectations, 50 per cent as 
meeting expectations, 15 per cent as above expectations and, finally, 10 per cent who are 
deemed to be excellent performers.  
 
    Diagram 3: A typical ‘normal’ distribution curve 
 
 
The principal problem is that there is no evidence at all that actual performance in an 
organisation does follow this ‘normal’ distribution. Such a distribution, it should be 
remembered, is a statistical exercise. Performance and achievement are variable to an 
extent that makes it impossible for employees to be ‘squeezed’ in these proportionate 
categories. If actual performance, however that might be defined, were the sole 
determining criteria for how employees were to be ranked then it is possible theoretically 
for an entire workforce to be performing above a notional targeted average. A forced 
distribution means that however well employees are performing a certain proportion in 
advance must necessarily be deemed to be underperforming. Managers are compelled to 
discriminate between employees according to these fixed percentages irrespective of 
actual performance. Thus, the charge of inequity can be laid against the use of forced 
distribution and the ‘Bell curve’.  
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The important question remain of the extent to which forced distribution is utilised by 
organisations. The academic literature suggests that it is a limited measure. For example, 
in the CIPD performance management survey of 2004, only 8 per cent of respondents 
reported that it was used. Evidence from the United States suggests that forced 
distribution is much more widespread there. Bach (2005: 289) suggests that a harder edge 
to appraisal has emerged with leading US companies such as General Electric, Microsoft 
and McKinsey placing a great deal of emphasis on measuring performance. If identifying 
and rewarding top performers is a priority, then so too must systematic measures be 
implemented to remove consistent underperformers, who are often termed ‘C’ players.  In 
a key passage in an influential book, ‘The War for Talent’, Michaels et al (2001) argued 
that it was necessary to get rid of the bottom 10 per cent of performers annually because 
their continued presence in the organisation served to create inertia and demotivate high 
performers. Bach provides examples of euphemisms to describe this process, including 
‘top-grading’, ‘bouncing’ and ‘ranking and yanking’, drawn from additional sources 
(Smart, 1999: 61-75; Ulrich and Smallwood, 2003: 90; Bunting, 2004: 97). It is claimed 
that the continuous elimination of so-called underperfromers ‘raises the bar’, that is to say 
it improves the overall level of performance in the business, but as Armstrong (2009: 
632) maintains, there is no evidence to support this claim.  
  
Indeed, subjectivity and bias might be exacerbated when it is the behaviours, traits, 
attitudes and personality characteristics of the individual employee that are the subject of 
ratings and scores. Behaviourally anchored rating scales (BARS) and behavioural 
observation scales (BOS) are specific methods of linking ratings with behavior at work 
(Torrington, 2011: 264).  
 
Several years ago, Williams (2002) could conclude that behaviourally-based criteria were 
not widely used. The empirical evidence from the case study companies suggests that 
they are now widely used and are key elements in the evaluation of employee 
performance. Over the past decade and increasingly in the post-financial crisis period, the 
growth of a significant degree of subjectivity in performance appraisal and management 
process is discernible.  
 
In addition, it has been observed that any approach to appraisal that uses pre-determined 
criteria, as the large majority do, has limitations. This is particularly so when the same 
criteria are used across a wide range of job roles, as each criteria may not be relevant. 
Such a universal approach neglects important differences in the characteristics of specific 
job roles and responsibilities (Beardwell and Claydon, 2010: 467).  A more essential 
criticism is that there is a tension, if not a fundamental contradiction, between the dual 
objectives of performance management as a developmental undertaking, on the one hand, 
and an element of an organization’s reward system, on the other hand.  This is the most 
trenchant criticism of Performance Management from ‘within’ an orthodox management 
framework’ (see e.g. Strebler et al, 2001; Wilson, 2002). These observations relate 
mostly to limitations in the construction and operation of performance appraisal.  
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An additional critique has been developed on philosophical or ethical grounds. This body 
of work challenges the unitarist principles and managerialist prerogatives that inform 
conventional approaches to performance appraisal (Beardwell and Claydon, 2010: 471). 
They advance, by contrast, a radical analysis that questions management’s objectives and 
their power to control, direct and shape employee behaviour. Such accounts have been 
based largely on the work of the French philosopher, Foucault, who developed the 
critique of organizations and institutions as ‘totalising’ regimes of surveillance, in which 
managers exercise complete control over employees and have eliminated their capacity 
for resistance and contestation.  
 
Management theorists, including Townley (1993) and Grey (1994) questioned the ethics 
of such close scrutiny of employers’ behaviour and work routines, regarding these 
manifestations of managerialism as a negative aspect of performance appraisal. 
Notwithstanding the importance of a critique that counters the assumption that appraisal 
is benign for employees, the ‘totalising’ perspective understates the capacity of 
employees to resist and of unions, where they exist and are vigilant and effective, to 
contest this discourse and practice.   
 
Despite this critical commentary, the dominant perspective amongst HRM scholars that is 
found in the texts is of Performance Management as benign and supportive of employees. 
To give one example, Armstrong (2009: 634) suggests that organizations might retain 
ratings because they believe that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. However, if 
they want to emphasise the developmental aspects - as it is suggested that they should – 
and ‘play down, even eliminate, the performance pay element [then they] will be 
convinced by the objections to rating and will dispense with the altogether..’. In short, 
organisations are advised to move away from stringent metrics-driven forms of 
Performance Management that are driven by monetary and/or punitive outcomes.  
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6 Changed Contexts of Work Organisation – HRM, Management Control, 
Work Intensification, Lean and Sickness Absence Management 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
The evolution of Performance Management from being largely synonymous with stand-
alone Performance Appraisal to become the more systematic, integrated and all-
embracing Performance Management as described above did not happen within a 
political-economic or organisational vacuum. In order to gain a fuller understanding of 
contemporary Performance Management and to foreground  the primary evidence 
presented in Section 7, it is necessary to consider some of the principal changes that have 
occurred in work orgnisation and employment relations over this period. Mindful of the 
temptation to discuss all the factors that have contributed to, or are manifestations of, 
changes in work organisation and employment, the following aspects have been 
identified as being of most salience for Performance Management; Human Resource 
Management, lean production, work intensification, sickness absence management, and 
occupational health and safety.  
 
6.2 Human Resource Management 
 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the dominant view of Performance Management 
has been that it is essentilly developemental in intent and that it delivers mutual benefits 
for both the organization and the employee. This benign view can be partly explained by 
the wider academic and practitioner perspective of Human Resource Management with 
which Performance Management has been closely associated.  
 
The earlier models of HRM that came to be influential in the UK focused on the central 
notion of commitment and how it could be achieved within organizations. Commitment 
models were explicitly contrasted with the then (supposedly) outdated labour utilisation 
systems and practices based on control and compliance (Walton, 1995; Beer et al, 1984). 
Such a distinction was also employed by UK academics attempting to distinguish HRM 
from old-style personnel management and industrial relations (e.g. Guest, 1987).  As 
HRM emerged in the UK, academic analysis identified two strands, dubbed by Storey 
(1992) as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ HRM (see also Legge, 1995).  
 
While the fomer calculative, ‘factor of production’  approach concentrated on the fit 
between flexible human resource utilisation and organisatonal strategy, the latter stressed 
the potential of employees as valued assests, whose skill development was the route to 
competitive advantage, and commitment to the organisation could be heightened through 
such practices as empowerment, employee involvement and teamworking. ‘Soft’ HRM 
stressed the development of trust, collaboration and communication and, in this new 
culture of commitment and mutual gains, individual employees could feel ‘empowered’ 
to exert discretionary effort or ‘constructive proactivity’ (Legge, 1995: 174). Within this 
‘soft’ HRM paradigm, the now familiar array of performance appraisal, individual 
performance related pay and development plans emerged. These initiatives could be seen 
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as the structural and organizational counterpoint to unitarist values based upon quality 
and the customer.  
 
For the best part of three decades, then, ‘soft’  HRM represented the ‘new orthodoxy’ in 
the study and practice of employment relations, albeit that it might have been an 
‘idealized and narrated model’ (Storey, 2005). Arguably, the tenacity of this ‘soft’ 
version obscured the reality of alternative ‘hard’ versions and a managerial practice that 
eschewed a developmental, mutual gains approach. A good example of the widespread 
illusion in the high trust and commitment view of HRM that permeated even critical 
thinking, is this quote from what is, in many ways, a critical text. 
 
Indeed, the ideas at the root of HRM are at the opposite pole to the ideas of 
marketized or commodified employment practice. (McGovern, 2007: 143) 
 
This assertion can be challenged for it ignores the ‘hard’ side of HRM, the calculative 
‘factor of production’ approach. It also neglects the important argument that ‘soft’ HRM 
practices can embody hard elements (Taylor and Ramsay, 1998). For example, delivering 
quality and ‘delighting’ the customer are principles that sit within the ‘soft’ HRM 
paradigm, but clearly customer feedback, the mystery shopper and monitiored telephone 
calls can have a hard disciplinary edge in practice. It is interesting, as we will discover 
from the primary evidence, that a common element in Performance Management metrics 
involves customer satisfaction scores which, if they fall below acceptable levels, can lead 
to improvement or corrective action. In other words, disciplinary or punitive outcomes 
are as likely as developmental or supportive measures.  
 
The existence  of certain practices (such as appraisals, teamworking) can not be assumed 
to be a proxy for developmental HRM, just as one of the fallacies  of the High 
Performance Work Systems literature (e.g. Applebaum et al, 2000) is that somehow 
bringing together a bundle of practices including teamworking, incentives, personal 
development/appraisals necessarily engenders mutuality,  harmony and a high performing 
workplace. In the ‘soft’ HRM/HPWS account, the line manager is the key driver of 
change, having discretion over operational issues, labour utilisation, recruitment, training, 
reward, appraisal and above all performance. The role of the line manager was defined as 
facilitator, coach, guide and developer of the human resources for which they were 
responsible. However, it is pertinent to raise the following question - what if the function 
of the line manager is not to lead in this developmental fashion, but to transmit 
downwards in classical hierarchical fashion, production norms and targets, so that for all 
there might be an appeal to ‘hearts and minds’ there is also the familiar imperative of 
employee compliance to management instruction?    
 
It is a compelling argument that HRM, with its powerful rhetoric of shared interest and 
mutual gains, served to mask capitalist restructuring. Hyman (1987) observed during 
early debates on the nature of HRM, that it was directed towards the simultaneous 
‘securing and obscuring’ of the commodity status of labour. Beneath the unitarist façade 
and the high-skill, high-commitment rhetotic there remained fundamental market 
imperatives such as cost minimization, growing labour market flexibility, downsizing and 
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redundancy. By the turn of the century, authors such as Capelli (2000), an erstwhile 
enthusiast for mutual gains HRM, were asking how management, having broken the 
psychological contracts’ promise of job security, could manage in conditions where 
employees’ commitment had been betrayed. There is now a significant body of literature 
that has questioned the degree to which the HRM project was ever able to deliver on its 
promise to create a more humane workplace (e.g. Baldry et al, 2007; Bolton and 
Houlihan, 2007; Legge, 1995; 2005; Thompson, 2003; 2011). What was being missed, 
then, in naïve versions of HRM (Thompson and Harley, 2007) were those shifts in the 
capitalist political economy that were generating organizational re-structuring, process re-
engineering and were transforming work organization. All of these developments had 
enormous implications for workers.  
 
6.3 Lean Production  
 
In this restructuring the adoption of lean production needs to be emphasized. Lean has 
been defined as an ‘all-encompassing model’ of work process reconfiguration, based on 
the integration of diverse Japanese production management techniques (Babson, 1995: 5), 
dervived from Japanese manufacturing systems. The philosophy, principles and 
techniques of lean were widely applied in the US and, latterly, in the UK. Lean promised 
to remove impediments to the smooth flow of production through continuous 
improvement (kaizen) in both quality and productivity, and to eliminate ‘wasted’ time 
and motion (muda) through the use of ‘just-in-time’ (J-I-T) inventory systems (kanban).  
 
In the classic text on lean, Womack et al (1990) argued that those organisations which 
succeeded in stripping out wasteful processes would secure the most significant gains in 
quality and efficiency. These advantages would be achieved through job rotation and by 
multiskilled team-based workers sharing responsibilities with management and solving 
problems together. Womack et al’s depiction of the new work system was undeniably 
optimistic, notably in the contention that ‘the freedom to control one’s work’ replaced the 
‘mind-numbing stress’ of Taylorist mass production. ‘Creative tension’ was now 
supposed to make work ‘humanly fulfilling’. If such claims of increased skills and 
decision-making authority (Landsbergis et al, 1999: 109) were true then, empirically, 
lean would be associated with a reduction in job strain and stress-related illness.  
 
However, subsequent studies of manual workers in manufacturing environments 
produced findings that did not support the optimistic claims made for lean. Critical 
research in the automotive industry revealed, not increased employee discretion, but 
tighter supervision and management control, narrow tasking, reduced involvement in 
decision making and greater job strain (Lewchuk and Robertson, 1997; Delbridge, 1998; 
Danford, 1999). Harmful physical and psychological effects, including repetitive and soft 
tissue injuries, musculo-skeletal disorders, burnout and stress were identified 
(Landsbergis et al, 1999; Stewart et al, 2009). 
 
Despite this evidence of bleaker outcomes for workers, a number of authors maintained 
that lean could be universally and non-problematically applied to clerical and servicing 
work (Womack and Jones, 2003). Business school consultants were quick to propagate 
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lean as a mutually beneficial (for managers and workers) paradigm for delivering public 
sector efficiencies (e.g. Radnor and Boaden, 2008). Lean’s appeal to central and local 
government and to private sector employers in the straitened budgetary conditions of 
austerity and the post-2008 ‘new normal’ (Kliman, 2012) was unsurprisingly compelling. 
Insofar as evidence exists of lean’s impact on white-collar work, however, the prognosis 
for workers and their health and well-being are as harsh as the evidence has been for 
manufacturing environments. The results of these studies are important given that much 
of the primary evidence below reports on workers’ experiences in white-collar and 
service environments.   
 
There is data from the call centres which, in the most common mass production variant  
(Batt and Moynihan, 2002), has been regarded as the prototypical ‘lean’ white-collar 
context (e.g. Sprigg et al, 2006; 2007; Taylor and Bain, 1999; 2007). Process 
simplification, short call cycle times and machine paced workflow integration are notable 
features of work organisation. Dialogue scripting (extreme standardisation) and intense 
performance monitoring have been isolated as defining characteristics of lean and 
directly related to job-related strain (Sprigg et al, 2006: 105; Taylor et al, 2003). The 
‘leaner’ the work organization and the more that call-throughput is prioritized, the less 
control over the timing and methods of work do call-handlers report. Workloads are 
higher and workers performed less varied tasks.  
 
Studies have demonstrated related outcomes. Crawford et al (2005) found an increase in 
reported musculo-skeletal disorders (MSDs), including discomfort in the neck, shoulders 
and wrists/arms. Sprigg et al (2007) found biomechanical factors (workload and 
repetitive movement) and psychosocial strain (low decision latitude) combining to  
produce MSDs. Indeed, they concluded that strain appears to be a mechanism between 
workload and upper body and lower back MSDs, while the relationship of workload with 
MSDs is explained by both the direct effect of biomechanical factors and the partial 
mediating effects of strain (ibid, p.1462). Sprigg et al’s (2006) concise verdict was, ‘the 
leaner the call centre, the meaner it will be’. 
 
The ill-health consequences for workers generated by the distinctive forms of work 
organization in ‘mass production’ contact centres (Batt and Moynihan, 2002) are quite 
well known. Deery et al (2002) found emotional exhaustion, while Baldry et al’s (2007) 
and Taylor et al’s (2003) studies documented extensive worker experiences of stress, 
mental fatigue, physical tiredness and MSD symptoms. A significant finding was that 
these symptoms and complaints were related to long periods spent at the work-station 
where workers were engaged in intensive, pressurized work, and faced the strict 
implementation of ‘performance’ targets, both quantitative and qualitative in character 
(Bain et al, 2002).  The Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) that are 
central to the architecture of the contct centre simultaneously facilitate the micro-
measurement and micro-management of employee performance. A persuasive case can 
be made for the claim that the call centre provided the template for the subsequent 
dissemination of the digitalised measurement and intense targeting across many white-
collar labour processes.   
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In related studies, Carter et al (2011a; 2011b) focus on lean, its impact on work 
organization and employee experiences in a clerical, non-customer facing environments. 
Their findings demonstrated a thoroughgoing deskilling of tax processesing, in which 
whole case working was fragmented into a series of discrete, standardized and repetitive 
tasks. The consequences for employees was equally profound, as they reported high 
levels of stress and widespread symptoms associated with MSDs (Carter et al, 2013). 
New forms of Performance Management, principally the strict imposition of hourly 
targets, were regarded as the single most significant cause of pressure by workers.  The 
evidence from these, most recent, studies of white-collar work organisation is that lean 
and performance management are integrated to form a new form of intensified and tighter 
labour regulation.  
 
6.4 Work Intensity or Intensification 
 
Synthesising the literature on critical HRM and lean working, a significant theme to 
emerge is that of work intensity/work intensification. A body of research (notably 
Burchell et al, 2002; Green, 2001; Green, 2006; McGovern et al, 2007) has specifically 
focused on these related concepts to refer to the amount of work/effort required of, and 
performed by, workers in each unit of time (intensity) and an increase in the amount of 
work/effort between comparable units of time over time (intensification).  
 
These studies confirm that the effort demanded of British employees has increased 
steadily over the past two decades. One study demonstrated that 31 per cent of employees 
in 1992 strongly agreed that their jobs required them to work very hard. By 2000 the 
proportion had risen to 40 per cent (McGovern et al, 2007). An additional and related 
finding for 2000 was that 56 per cent of employees believed they were working harder 
than they had been two years previously. This proportion compared to only 12 per cent 
who said they were working less hard. Although these percentage increases might appear 
to be relatively small, it should be borne in mind that studies had established that work 
pressures and work strain were already at high levels by 1992 (Gallie et al, 1998: 218-
231). 
 
Green’s research (2001; 2004; 2006) has been influential in deepening our understanding 
of work intensification. Green has argued that the principal causes are rooted in 
technological and organizational change, but other institutional factors have also 
contributed to a greater or lesser extent. These factors include HR policies such as ‘high 
involvement’ work systems, declining trade union density or influence and job insecurity. 
For Green, work intensification has been associated with the closed ‘porosity’ of the 
working day as the time gaps between tasks shorten and employees have less opportunity 
to recover mentally and physically before the onset of rhe next demand. The outcome has 
been an increase in the psychological experience of overwork and work strain or work 
stress. In demonstrating that intensification grew from the mid-1990s onwards, and is 
associated with changed work organisation, flexibility and the effects of IT, Green 
concludes that ‘the detrimental impact is unambiguous’ (2006: 174). McGovern et al 
(2007: 186), similarly, have emphasized the increased bureaucratic discipline and the 
deleterious effects of ICT-based monitoring. This body of work resonates with those 
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critical studies of lean (Section 6.3) that have identified changed work circumstances – 
flexibility, just-in-time production - as having accelerated the flow of the work and 
increased the demands upon workers. The outcome, according to McGovern et al (2007: 
151) is that ‘Overwork is a widespread condition among employed people in Britain’.  
 
The question has been raised as to why workers have tended to ‘go along with’ these 
demands that have led to work intensification.  For many commentators, according to 
McGovern et al (2007), work intensification is closely associated with market 
uncertainty, job insecurity and the transfer of risk from employer to employee. Fear of 
job loss has compelled individuals to accept a ratcheting up of work demands. Therefore, 
employers can rely on insecure market conditions to simplify their task of extracting 
more effort from the workforce. The periods of mass unemployment arguably changed 
conditions in the longer term. They generated new institutions, or norms, that have 
continued to create anxiety or fear, even after mass unemployment has ended. 
Redundancy has become a normal method of adjusting workforce numbers (Turnbull and 
Wass, 2000).  
 
With the level of redundancies remaining high in periods of rising employment and the 
belief among workers that they will get a worse job if they get made redundant then hard-
work, staying in the good books and becoming a compliant employee may be an 
explanation for intensification. Such an analysis is consistent with Cappelli’s (1999) 
‘frightened workers’ model’. The UK literature on job insecurity and redundancy norms 
and Cappelli’s ‘frightened worker’ model under repetitive downsizing go some way 
towards providing a plausible account of how effort can be raised by exposure to market 
competition. For McGovern et al (2007: 135) employers then develop policies that 
‘harness the motivation of insecurity’. The same authors summarised their evidence as 
follows,  
 
Overall, the results provide reasonably good evidence that employers exert high 
levels of effort in insecure conditions. This appears both when personal job loss 
appears imminent, so that anxiety about insecurity is likely to be acute, and still 
more clearly in the medium-term aftermath of wider workplace reductions’. The 
longer-term background of insecurity seems to provide motivational ‘stick’ since 
the effect on effort is persistent. (ibid:141)  
 
An alternative interpretation might be ‘based on the growth of internal systems of control 
and incentives that organizations can apply to achieve higher performance’ (McGovern et 
al, 2007: 129).  Framed in these terms, then, the debate appears to be between the effects 
on workers of the discipline of the market, on the one hand, and of bureaucratic discipline 
on the other. In short, the distinction is between the discipline produced by threatening 
external conditions and the discipline produced by command and control (ibid:130).  
 
However, a more convincing line of argument might be to contend that positing market 
discipline and bureaucratic discipline as alternatives might be an invalid counterposition. 
Market discipline and bureaucratic control could be better seen as dialectically 
connected. For example, in conditions of tightened economic competition or, more so, of 
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economic crisis and recession, organisations might respond to changed market conditions 
through modified Service Level Agreements, increased KPIs and escalating performance 
targets. In other words, in response to harsher market discipline organisations translate 
the market signals and pressures into tighter control over workers in the form of 
measurable (bureaucratic) performance criteria. Burchell et al (2002), for example, 
argued that there is a relationship between background pressures on management from 
increasingly competitive markets to work intensification. 
 
Differing mediating stages exist as an organization translates market impertives into 
front-line operational worker targets. The influence is not always immediate and 
undeviating, but there is a causal chain with an identifiable direction. Internal command 
and control are given justification and compulsion through external market realities. At 
the same time, the influence of the market can bear directly on workers. Economic 
turbulence, crisis, recession and redundancies can contribute to workers insecurities, 
creating the sense that it is necessary to work harder and to accept greater performance 
targets in order to maintain job security.  
 
Some studies have attempted to analyse the concrete linkages between broader political 
economy and front-line workload. In terms of the call centre (Taylor et al, 2005; Taylor 
and Bain 2007), it has been argued senior management formulate organization-wide 
targets (e.g. cost, market share) as they forecast trends and position their companies vis-a-
vis rivals in volatile markets. These broad targets are then calculated for 
business/function, and translated down to individual centres as cost and/or profit centres. 
Centre managers then disaggregate key performance indicators (KPIs) for various 
workflows. In turn, middle managers, finally, ensure that teams and individual call 
handlers meet specific, individualised targets. This sequence helps explain supervisory 
obsession with statistical measurement of productivity and employee compliance with 
SLAs. Target adherence ‘from the bottom up’ is central to the continuous internal and 
external benchmarking by which progress towards corporate objectives is evaluated. 
 
It follows that changes in economic milieux can precipitate a modification of corporate 
objectives and, in turn, impact on work organization. Taylor et al (2005) found that from 
the mid-1990s tightened quantitative targets and extended qualitative monitoring became 
observable trends, developments that could be understood more fully by reference to 
prevailing conditions in the broader economy and also at sectoral levels. As general 
factors, the collapse of the speculative boom of the mid-1990s and then the dot.com crash 
created problems of profitability in the ‘new economy’. These then contributed to 
widespread recessionary pressures. Consequently, in diverse sectors, notably including 
financial services and telecommunications, cost reduction became an operational 
imperative. Now, if this was a reasonable depiction of the causal chain in the 
circumstances of the crisis of the new economy, then it raises in sharper relief the greater 
consequences for work organisation and intensification deriving from the far more 
dramatic economic crisis and recession of 2007 onwards (see e.g. Kliman, 2012). 
 
It is interesting to note that these influential studies of Burchell et al (2002), Green (2001; 
2006) and McGovern et al (2007), which all attest to an intesfication of effort and a 
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resultant increase in work strain, were based upon evidence from the period preceding the 
great crisis.  If intensification and work strain were the outcomes of a longer period of 
technological and organisational changes, themselves influenced by broader market 
conditions then prima facie, it might be supposed that the consequences for workers 
deriving directly and indirectly from the abruptly changed economic situation of post-
2007,  might be more profound. In this respect, the trade union respondents below 
(Section 7) are reporting on the experiences of their members who have survived the 
post-2007 waves of redundancies and downsizing. The literature makes frequent 
reference to the term ‘survivor syndrome’ used to desciribe the conditions of those who 
have avoided being made rendundant and for whom the experience is one of intesfication 
brought about by having ‘do more with less’.   
 
6.5 Sickness Absence Management 
 
Recent academic work suggests that the management of sickness absence has undergone 
a significant long-term shift over the past two decades, but which has accelerated in the 
context of recession and government austerity (Main and Taylor, 2011; Taylor et al, 
2010). Employers have become preoccupied with minimising, if not eliminating, both 
short-term and long-term absence in the context of the commonly held and widely 
propogated view that malingering is endemic in ‘sick note Britain’, and that many 
workers are ‘swinging the lead’, or in the current parlance, taking ‘duvet days’. The 
public sector, it is asserted, is held to be particularly problematic.  
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of these assumptions, statistical support from the 
frequently quoted surveys of the CIPD, Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and the Work Foundation is hard to come by. Critical scrutiny of the 
available data does not reveal sickness absence as having increased in the recent past but, 
rather, that it is at an historically low level. The recent CBI (2011) study reported an 
average of 6.5 days lost per employee for 2011, compared to 6.8 days in 2008 and 8.5 
days in 1998. LFS figures show decreased sickness absence between 2001 and 2006 
(Leaker, 2006). Indeed, the CBI (2006) has estimated that ‘non-genuine’ absence forms 
only 12 per cent of the total number ‘lost’ to absence. According to the most recent 
Office of National Statistics figures sickness absence had fallen to 4.5 days by 2011, 
compared to 7.2 days in 1993 (ONS, 2012). 
Despite claims that ‘sickies’ are linked to ‘long weekends’ and major sporting events 
(CBI, 2007), studies show that sickness absence is evenly spread throughout the week. 
Higher levels of absence on Mondays and Fridays for non-genuine reasons is a myth 
(Barham and Begum, 2005). There is evidence of higher absence in the public sector, 
albeit to a limited extent. The CBI contrasted 8.1 days per annum in the public sector to 
5.9 days in the private sector (2007), the same figures as were reported for 2011 (CBI, 
2012). A HSE (2004) report cautions against reading too much into these differences. 
When adjustments are made for age, gender and organisation size, mean differences 
between private and public sector were modest at an average of 0.3 days per annum. 
Residual differences are related to widespread under-reporting and less favourable sick 
pay arrangements in the private sector (Holmes, 2008). Finally, studies demonstrate that 
presenteeism is more prevalent among public sector employees, who are more likely to 
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work when ill, for reasons that include job insecurity following organisational 
restructuring, the lack of replacement and a sense of commitment and responsibility to 
service users (Aronsson et al., 2000; Caverley et al., 2007; HSE, 2004). 
 
Despite the absence of statistical support for ‘sick note Britain’, a raft of prescriptive 
measures have been introduced at organisational level for when workers go sick, such as 
the ubiquitous ‘return to work’ interview (RWI), detailed reporting systems and home 
visits, which have been accompanied by the widespread utilisation of metrics, absence 
scores and trigger points that alert managers to employees’ supposedly excessive 
absence. The key regulatory change that triggered these measures was the Statutory Sick 
Pay (SSP) Act of 1994, by which the responsibility paying statutory sick pay transferred 
from the state to employer. The fact that employers assumed this burden was hugely 
significant, creating intense managerial interest in controlling absence and, ultimately, the 
micro-management of employee behaviour (Bevan and Heyday, 1998). Two significamnt 
trends can be discerned. 
 
First, from the mid-1990s, organisations increasingly gathered data by grade, occupation, 
area of work, function and location. Computerised employee absence records provided 
management with a pseudo-scientific basis for analysis and action. Typically, monthly, 
quarterly and annual statistics formed the basis for managerial intervention, notably 
where employees hit absence ‘trigger points’. Failure to improve scores accelerated 
workers through procedural stages, leading ultimately to dismissal. The ‘Bradford factor’, 
which disproportionately penalises short-term absence (IDS, 2009), was widely adopted, 
as managers perceived this form of non-attendance to be the most serious expression of 
voluntary and illegitimate absence. The Bradford factor has been criticised for denying 
the legitimacy of all short-term absence and for leading to disciplinary action, including 
dismissal, on the basis of these non-scientific measurements (Perrett and Martinez Lucio, 
2006). The blanket use of trigger points has been seen as causing resentment and stress 
(Grinyer and Singleton, 2001) and forcing a premature return to work. 
 
Second, what were often previously informal practices were formalised into newly 
articulated policies and tightly prescribed procedures. New procedures include home 
visits and the obligations on workers to keep management regularly informed of absence 
and to provide GP sicknotes even during self-certification periods. Return to Work 
Interviews (RWIs) became the most frequently utilised procedure. In practice, RWIs 
conflate caring and welfarist intentions (soft HRM) with calculative and disciplinary 
motives (hard HRM), but, principally, emphasise getting people back to work rather than 
focusing on the problems that might have made people sick in the first place. Penalising 
the sick through linking absence policies to disciplinary action is the second most 
common intervention (CIPD, 2008), and for many organisations their principal or even 
sole sanction (Dunn and Wilkinson, 2002). Relating sickness absence to discipline may 
contradict, collide and ultimately undermine parallel organisational approaches to 
managing absence that focus on rehabilitation, return to work and the job security of the 
long-term sick (Cunningham et al., 2004; 2006). 
 
Empirical data gathered over more than a decade from related projects into white collar 
work and workers health and well-being indicate a progressive tightening of management 
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control (Taylor et al, 2010). What is most notable is increasing numbers of workers 
attending work when ill. Three principle reasons emerge as the most important. First, 
employees report the pressure experienced by managers and supervisors as the most 
significant cause of their ‘presenteeism’. Second,  the Sickness Absence Policy (SAP) 
itself has been regarded as precipitating a premature return to work. Third, a growing 
minority of respondents have indicated that fear of disciplinary action has compelled 
them to attend work when ill. In respect of one of this report’s central objectives, of 
attempting to understand the linkages between new forms of performance management 
and well-being and mental ill-health, it should be noted that insofar as these tighter 
sickness absence management policies and practices can be regarded as an element of 
performance management, they have been seen by employees in these studies to 
contribute to ill-health.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative  evidence confirms that many employees were dragging 
themselves into work when sick, fearful of disciplinary action or even of losing their job. 
Comments vividly illustrate the widespread perception that ill health was work related, 
arising from the pressure of relentless task performance where the micro-management of 
unachievable performance targets was prevalent (Taylor et al.,2003). Many reported a 
vicious circle; work contributes to ill health, but rather than being able to take sufficient 
time off and recover, employees through the pressure of SAPs must either remain at work 
when they are patently unwell sick, or return to work prematurely.  
 
Both courses of action have the potential to exacerbate workers’ ill-health. Over many 
years and from diverse sectors and organisations, employees have provided a mass of 
testimony illustrating the connections between intense and pressurised work, performance 
management and ill-health and the negative contribution of harsher sickness absence 
management policies and practice. The following is but one example out of the many 100 
that could be cited.  
 
I used to enjoy my job, but it has gone progressively downhill. I quite often feel 
physically sick about going to work, I’m constantly low or depressed and look for 
reasons to not attend work although I do actually go in . . . Management do not 
care and are not interested in anything the staff tell them and turn a blind eye 
thinking if the problem is ignored long enough it will go away (staffing situation 
is a classic example). Even though staff go off sick with work-related stress, their  
answer is to introduce new sickness policy and staff feel even worse. Once upon a 
time I would have considered my job as a good career prospect. I am now 
concerned for my health and well-being and consequently looking for another job 
(Female communications operator, aged 39, Police Communications Centre).  
 
Stringent sickness absence policy, and the tendency by many managers to contest the 
legitimacy of absence and its causes leads, in some cases, to an underestatement of the 
extent of stress-related conditions. The following testimony by a union representative in 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
 
People are going off through work-related stress but management don’t accept 
that. The current statistic for 800 staff in processing is 61 stress cases, but only 11 
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have cited workplace stress, so management say 11 out of 800 is not bad. The 
medical certificate doesn’t say workplace stress, it just says stress. It’s a big area 
of contestation. There are huge tranches of coughs, colds, sneezes, sickness, 
diarrhoea, symptomatic of stress but people are not confident in their own 
position or relationship with their manager and do not feel they can say ‘Actually, 
I’m just stressed out of my box, because that place is a hell hole’. (Interview, PCS 
representive, 26 October 2008). 
 
Studies of sickness absence management at Glasgow City Council (Main, 2007; Main 
and Taylor, 2011) provide a focused public sector case study of the consequences for 
workers of a new sickness absence management regime. The tough policy culminated, in 
2009, in the Council declaring a ‘War on Sickies’ and in occupational sick pay being 
withdrawn from certain categories of sick employees. Almost all of those surveyed 
believed that SAPs were being imposed unfairly and harshly, many describing them as 
‘punitive’, ‘Victorian’, ‘Dickensian’ and ‘draconian’. Almost 80 per cent were more 
likely to attend work when ill and two-thirds believed that managers acted without regard 
or sympathy for an employee’s situation (Main, 2007). Unison shop stewards reported 
that, on average, they were now spending 46 per cent of their time on union activities 
representing individual members facing disciplinary action over breaches of sickness 
absence procedure (Main and Taylor, 2011).  
 
In sum, the evidence is compelling that strict absence control has become embedded in 
many organisations as an integral element of labour cost reduction strategies. Erstwhile 
distinctions between sickness absence and absenteeism are being eroded as employers 
increasingly view all absence as, if not illegitimate, an unwelcome cost to be minimised 
(Taylor et al, 2010: 283). Worker behaviours previously tolerated as ‘reasonable’ are now 
defined as unacceptable as the ethos and substance of policy moves even further from 
welfarism to discipline. Furthermore, policies have been identified as actively 
contributing to worker ill-health and to negative consequences for well-being.  
 
6.6 Occupationally Related Mental Ill-Health 
 
Government statistics provide some indication of the scale of the problem of work-related 
sickness and ill-health. Of the 1.2 million work-related ill-health cases in 2010-11, 
508,000 individuals were afflicted by (MSD) and 400,000 by stress, depression and 
anxiety (SDA), the latter collectively constituting the largest single source of the 26.4 
million days lost to work-related ill-health (see Table 3). An estimated 211,000 people 
first became aware of work-related stress, depression or anxiety during this same 
reference period (HSE, 2012).  
 
If there is now greater identification of the existence of MSDs and SDAs, there is no 
unanimity regarding the direction of incidence, even though the statistics suggest decline. 
THOR surveillance data between 2000 and 2008 suggest that psychiatric reports of work-
related mental health remained stable, but occupational physician reports, conversely, 
show a distinct upward trend (HSE, 2010b). One significant limitation of this broad 
statistical data is that they cannot provide an in-depth analysis of the causal factors 
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underpinning them. Furthermore, if the circumstances reported by the PCS rep above are 
replicated elsewhere, then it may be that job insecurities are causing employees not to 
report suffering from stress, while employers may be relucant to record SDAs. Although 
such reasoning is speculative it might be supposed that the tightened nature of SAPs 
might lead to under-reporting by both employees and employers.  
 
Table 3: Selected UK Health and Safety Statistics 2004-5 to 2008-9 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Fatalities 
 
Reportable 
Injuries 
(LFS) 
Work-related  
ill-health  
No. of             
 People               Type 
Work-
related ill-
health new 
cases 
     Working days lost 
              
                  Ill- 
Total     Health    Injuries 
2010-11 171 
(0.6 per 100,000) 
200,000 1.2m MSD – 508,000 
SDA – 400,000 
495,000 26.4m 22.1m 4.4m 
2009-10 152 
(0.5 per 100,000) 
233,000 1.3m MSD – 572,000 
SDA – 435,000 
554,000 28.5m 23.4m 5.1m 
2008-9 180 
(0.6 per 100,000)  
246,000 1.2m MSD -  538,000 
SDA –  415,000 
551,100 29.3m 24.6m 4.7m 
2007-8 229 
(0.8 per 100,000) 
299,000 1.3m MSD -  539,000 
SDA –  442,000 
563,000 34m 28m 6m 
2006-7 241 
(0.8 per 100,000) 
274,000 2.2m MSD – 1,140,000 
SDA –  530,000 
 
646,000 36m 30m 6m 
2005-6 212 
(0.7 per 100,000) 
328,000 2.0m MSD – 1,020,000 
SDA –   420,000 
 
523,000 30m 24m  6m 
2004-5 220 
(0.7 per 100,000) 
363,000 2.0m  MSD – 1,010,000 
SDA -   509,000 
576,000 35m 28m 7m 
Sources: Health and Safety Executive (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012) 
 
6.7 Summary  
 
Despite progress in recognising SDAs and MSDs as disabling illnesses, much still needs 
to be done to extend current Occupational Health and Safety perspectives to examine the 
complex relationships between workers’ reported ill-health and working conditions, that 
include the factors identified in this section; the consequences of ‘hard’ HRM, lean 
working, work intensity and intensification and more stringent sickness absence 
management. It is within these changed contexts of work organization and ‘people 
management’ that Performance Management has been developed. Turning to an analysis 
of the primary evidence - largely but not exclusively - from the interviews with trade 
union officers and representatives, it can be seen that Performance Management is a key 
element in a new managerial strategy. Performance Management, as part of a developing 
‘hard’ HRM strategy is integrated with forms of lean working and tough sickness absence 
management to form an almost indivisible offensive that has deleterious outcomes for 
workers. 
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7 The Evidence from the Front Line 
 
Given the paucity of critical academic literature on contemporary developments in 
Performance Management and, in particular, on its effects on workers, the data in this 
section provides valuable insight into the nature and effects of Performance Management.  
 
7.1 The Emergence of Performance Management  
 
There was a strong consensus amongst union interviewees regarding the emergence and 
evolution of the forms of Performance Management in the organizations for which they 
were responsible or held representative roles. It was widely acknowledged that 
performance management policies and procedures had been in place since the 1990s, and 
that performance appraisals and individualised pay systems had dominated the early 
initiatives.  
 
Respondents located Performance Management within the wider political-economic, 
sectoral and organizational contexts that had generated a managerial preoccupation with 
cost-cutting. The first wave in the financial services sector seems to have originated in 
the mid-1990s when competitive pressures intensified in the aftermath of sectoral 
deregulation. According to the seconded rep of Bank C,  
 
It was when the [the new CEO] came into [Bank C] and drove these types of 
changes. The bank stopped being a ‘cradle to grave’ type of employer and the 
employees came to have their performance measured against key indicators - key 
results they called it. So in about the mid-1990s they introduced a system called 
Maximising Performance and referred to it as Max. Running alongside this 
initiative the bank introduced a new pay matrix, competency based pay and 
market reference salaries and so on, so one outcome was rewarded by another set 
of criteria. 
 
However, in both financial services and telcommunications, it was the collapse of the 
dot.com boom and ensuing recessionary pressures that precipitated a decisive ratcheting 
up of competition in the longer-term context of increasingly de-regulated markets. In 
financial services, competition was heightened by merger and acquisition and, in 
telceommunications, by the emergence of challenges to the incumbent British Telecom. 
Respondents identified the key change in the purpose and outcomes of Performance 
Management as occurring between 2000 and 2003. 
 
One respondent from financial services reflected on the consequences of the merger in 
2001 of the Halifax and the Bank of Scotland to form HBOS. From this officer’s 
perspective.  
 
…it was the Halifax takeover which brought in a changed Performance 
Management agenda and the introduction of the targets and sales culture, which 
rapidly becamre ‘entrprteneurial’. (Bank A National Officer) 
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In the National Australia Group, the national officer recalled the Performance 
Management Framework as dating from 2001, although it had been ‘refined quite a bit 
over the years’. In the Royal Bank of Scotland, this same period of the early 1990s saw 
the change from Maximising Performance to the Performance Excellence Framework 
(2002) which involved the transition from a largely relaxed customer service culture to… 
 
…time being imposed on workers, records kept of conversations with customers, 
the numbers of leads, products sold and so on. The harder edge was evident from 
the turn of the year 2000 and by the time we got to 2004-5, it was full steam 
ahead, no holds barred sales and targeting. (Bank C seconded rep) 
 
For one CWU Regional Officer, it was the intensified competition in telecommunications 
that precipitated the shift towards a more punitive form of Performance Management in 
British Telecom. 
 
To me the catalyst was the adoption of HR practices from the US, but the added 
impetus and company justification for this process was the supposed threat of 
competition from Virgin Media, Cable and Wireless and later the Car Phone 
Warehouse, Talk Talk and so on. Voice communications is only a small part of 
the overall business in the sector. The market is now broadband, voice and 
television and increasingly companies have networks and are bundling these 
products together. It’s very, very competitive. When Open Reach was put in 
place, it was it was about how other companies gained access to BT’s networks, 
so there are now 100s of what are called communications providers. Hastening 
the competition has led to another cliché, the race to the bottom in pricing, which 
puts even greater pressure on labour costs and leads to tougher Performance 
Management (Telecoms, CWU Regional Secretary).   
 
Contrary to what might be supposed, the evidence confirms that the watershed in 
Performance Management, the implementation of tougher measures and stricter 
implementation with disciplinary outcomes actually pre-dated the financial crisis of 2008. 
The recession subsequently provided the context and justification for organizations to 
accelerate and intensify existing programmes and practices of intensive micro-
measurement and management.  
 
…from then on it got much more stringent because they [the company] could get 
away with it, becasuse the press would applaud them for getting rid of the dead 
wood, as they would class it. They would say, ‘Well that’s what should happen 
with these bankers, get rid of them and our money is safer’. They don’t 
distinguish between the bankers who make the decisions and the workers who are 
carrying the can for them. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
Respondents reported that Performance Mangement had been used ‘very substantially’ in 
British Telecom and other companies for over ten years. The evidence from BT (and 
elsewhere) suggests that PM was developed first in the call centres, facilitated by the 
socio-technical control mechanisms that lie at the heart of these operations, and was 
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widely adopted thereafter throughout the different divisions of the company to the extent 
that the entire BT workforce has become performance managed. The evidence is 
compelling that technological innovation and adaptation have underpinned PM’s 
diffusion by virtue of the ability to enhance the mechanisms of managerial control and 
surveillance.  
 
If you take the case of a field engineer now you can see that a van driver goes 
about with a hand held terminal or a laptop. These devices have intensified 
Performance Management. Prior to their implementation computer systems had 
been developed but they relied on the manual input of information. As the process 
has been made electronic it has been stepped up. Every piece of technology brings 
with it an intensification that fits in with Performance Management. A good 
example is the GSM trackers in the vans because they have upped the pressure of 
the guys in the field to produce even more. These people are now tied to their job 
completely. Every time their van moves it is monitored. They can be tracked and 
timed by mobile phones, laptops and GSM. You see managers sitting down with 
engineers and talking to them about minutes. ‘You were on a job for 1 hour and 
47 minutes, you really ought to have been there for 1 hour and 38 minutes. (CWU 
National Officer) 
 
A Branch Officer responsible for contact centres in British Telecom reported, similarly, 
that the company had operated Peformance Management for many years. Office based 
work had always involved performance measures, but the identifiable roots of 
Performance Management lay in the growth of the call centre environment with the 
monitoring of call handling times (CHTs), adherence times, wrap times and most 
quantitative measurables. Indeed, it was harshly imposed targets and an aggressive 
management style had underlain the 1999 dispute between British Telecom and the CWU 
(Eiroline, 1999). Subsequently, Performance Management had continued to evolve.  
 
This officer reported that for a period thereafter Performance Management had actually 
been welcomed in principle by the union insofar as it could be regarded as ‘supportive of 
employees, and that coaching to improve performance and lift employees’ level of 
achievement was a desirable objective’. However, the union position that it was possible 
to accept Performance Management, and that attempts could be made to work with it, 
was not sustainable in the longer term as it became more aggressively utilised as a form 
of control over, and a disciplinary mechanism against, workers.  
 
7.2   From Performance Appraisal to Performance Management  
 
Prior to the step change that occurred in its content and purpose, as documented above, 
the defining characteristic of Perfromance Management was appraisal. Respondents 
reported some variation but typically appraisal would take place on an annual basis with, 
at the most, mid-term or interim appraisals and perhaps informal discussions occurring 
three-monthly. Interviewees gave diverse accounts and perceptions of the transition from 
the characteristic performance appraisal system to the intensive and continuous process 
of Performance Management. For this national officer,  
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It came in sneakily. It was one of those changes that you didn’t really get a clear 
vision of, but then it had become the stick rather than the carrot. In any area where 
there were sales targets, it changed quickly because the manager, who was 
supposed to play a supportive role, was now given the targets he or she had to hit 
themselves (Bank A National Officer). 
 
In the National Australia Group (NAG), the Performance Management Framework 
evolved from being essentially an annual appraisal process in its original articulation to 
consisting of  regular 1-to-1s, and half-yearly, even quarterly meetings, based on 
continuous scoring and evaluation and the bell curve, even though the use of the latter 
technique was and remains frequently denied by organizations in public. The transition 
has involved the more stringent application and interpretation of all kind of criteria.  
 
In the past you would find that most people were put in the Fully Comepetent 
bracket without much discussion about how they performed, whereas over the last 
few years what has happened is that the focus has been much more on ‘Right, 
what are you delivering for us in terms of value for money, are you worth your 
pay increase or not?’ Previously it was not scrutinised in the way that it is now. 
(Bank B, National Officer) 
 
The Performance Management systems that respondents had experience of confirmed 
academic accounts that identified five categories. For example, in NAG the categories 
were unsatisfactory, needs improvement, fully competent, commendable and outstanding. 
What lies behind these categories is an assessment of employee performance, including 
diverse quantitative (measurable) and qualitative (assessable) criteria which typically are 
considered together in some kind of balanced scorecard or matrix.  
 
The scorecard is quite a complicated looking thing and all the boxes have to be 
ticked off. People are then given red, amber or green gateways. Now if you have a 
red gateway, what this means is that you cannot be fully competent, so you’re on 
needs improvement which which means that you won’t get a pay rise and you 
won’t get a bonus. (Bank B, National Officer)  
 
7.2.1  Quantitative Targets 
 
One of the main components and enablers of Performance Management as a systemic 
devices was and remains the quantitative measurement of output. The intensive 
measurement of the constituent elements of employee performance derived mainly, if not 
exclusively, from the ICT-enabled services of the call centre. These statistical 
measurements are translated into an array of targets, as discussed above, imposed upon 
individual employees (see Bain et al, 2002; Taylor and Bain, 2001; 2007).  
 
Stats and targets were used in the call centres, of course, and they spread from 
there. But they could also use the technology to measure and monitor the turn 
around times in the processing of payments, such as 200 payments a day at two 
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minutes. Some were more complex than others – the bank stripped out all of the 
straightforward ones and another team would get the more complex ones. So from 
the mid-1990s it became much more automated and measured and a hold was 
placed on multi-skilling where workers’ output and performnance were much 
more difficult to quantify (Bank C Seconded Rep).  
 
7.2.2  Behaviours  
 
The importance that has become attached to employee ‘behaviours’ should not be 
understated. While the ‘objectivity’ of quantitative targets is certainly questionable, as 
these are managerially constructed criteria of dubious ‘scientific’ validity, the evaluation 
of employee ‘behaviours’ and ‘attitudes’ are even more open to the charge of subjectivity 
and arbitrariness. Table 4 provides an (anonymised) actual example of the microscopic, 
even claustrophobic, evaluation of employee behaviours that increasingly forms an 
integral part of performance management. All of the organizations for which we have 
documentation operate according to similar criteria. Despite marginal differences in 
emphasis and detail, employee handbooks are conveying very similar messages. Using 
this document as exemplar, it is helpful to indicate some of the more obvious difficulties 
with this prescription of behaviours. 
 
Firstly, the traits and characteristics that organisations purport to be able to evaluate are 
questionable. It is reasonable to ask what is being measured. The criteria seem designed 
to produce, indeed to socially and psychologically engineer, a specific type of disciplined 
and compliant, yet hardworking and collaborative employee. Such a narrow and idealized 
profile of desired behaviours is self-evidently incompatible with the range of personality 
types within any existing workforce. Further, it is questionable how these desired 
behaviours relate to the achievement of individual or organizational performance. To take 
one example: ‘Works in isolation and focuses on own tasks…’ is held to be characterictic 
of a ‘D’ behaviour rating under the ‘Work Together’ category, yet it could be argued that 
the design of particular jobs as, for example, in a call centre unavoidably means a degree 
of working on one’s own (van den Broek et al, 2004). Whilst acknowledging the 
significance of some knowledge sharing between colleagues, it is true that in the case of 
call-handlers and other roles that focusing on ones own tasks might actually be positive 
behavior.  
 
Secondly, the range of referrent behaviours is extensive. Even if we make the major (and 
untenable) assumption that the identified behaviours are justifiable as valid measures, it is 
impossible to envisage how any team leader or manager could take full cognizance of the 
thirteen different behaviours and then to apply them in the course of the continuous 
supervision and monitoring that is required. It would surely be an impossible task to 
apply these criteria to each and every individual worker.  How could a team leader or 
manager be able to evaluate with any degree of precision all of these  ‘behaviours’ for all 
of the many subordinates for whom they might be responsible?  
 
Thirdly, and closely related to this critical issue, is the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the rating categories for each of the behaviours. For example, how would a line 
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manager appropriately differentiate between an individual displaying a behaviour which 
‘Goes above and beyond to seek out and listens (sic) to ideas and contributions from a 
diverse group of people’ (Role model) and one that ‘Encourages others to contribute and 
listens to and considers others’ ideas and contributions’ (Demonstrates)? On the basis of 
such impossibly finely-grained decisions specific rankings for individual workers may 
result, leading perhaps to differentiated pay increases or where an invidual employee 
ended up either the overall green, amber or red ‘gateway’ rating.  
 
In telecommunications employee behaviours were evaluated in call centres before being 
applied more generally to other groups of workers, including field engineers. The 
legitimacy of the concept itself and the criteria utilised under the general rubric of 
‘behaviours’ were critiqued by many interviewees. Union officers questioned the 
appropriateness of applying ‘behaviours’ like ‘communication skills’ to field engineers, 
for whom the quality of completed jobs was regarded as the most important criteria. The 
intangible and subjective nature of these ‘behaviours’ were regarded as problematic.  
 
The company has got all these ‘values’ and they talk about being professional, but 
being professional is not about doing your job well, it means being ‘inspiring’ or 
having ‘heart’. How do you judge someone on their heart? What does it mean? So 
they have decided what it means and they judge people accordingly.  It’s 
subjective and leaves people vulnerable to the whim of a supervisor. Another 
example is participation in team meetings. If you get a low participation score, 
you are looked upon as being not particularly co-operative or interested. You can 
sit there ar a meeting and say very little and be marked down regardless of how 
well you are at doing your job. (Telecommunications, Regional Officer) 
 
Several respondents commented on the fact the nebulous nature of behaviours and the 
subjectivity of scoring were intentional. Not only did they provide line management with 
criteria that could strengthen their authortity, but their intangibility made it difficult for an 
individual (or the union) to challenge what was perceived by an individual to be an unfair 
score. Behavious and ‘soft’ targets provided the easiest way to mark someone down. For 
example, in BT Retail when senior management did take the pressure off call handling 
times following union intervention, union respondents reported that the focus shifted to 
the more subjective customer satisfaction scores and even behaviours such as being 
‘inspirational’.  
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Table 4: An Example of Performance Management Behaviours 
Enterprise Behaviours 
Behaviour descriptors rating guide 
The following provides the behavior descriptors against which Bank X employees are assessed as part of the performance management process. For each behavior descriptor, a 
rating of A to D is to be provided. The behaviour rating should reflect both how often (frequency) and how well (quality) the behaviours are demonstrated. 
o The A-D descriptions articulate the quality of the behavior 
o The behaviour rating is then determined by identifying which A-D description is displayed the majority of the time 
Be Authentic and Respectful 
 A 
(Role Models) 
B 
(Demonstrates) 
C 
(Requires improvement) 
D 
(Rarely or  
never demonstrates) 
Value individual 
contributions and differences 
and empathise with other 
situations 
Takes the time and goes out of their 
way to understand others’ situations, 
backgrounds or points of view even if 
it contradicts or challenges their own 
way of thinking 
Asks about and tries to 
understand a diverse range of 
situations, backgrounds or points 
of view before making decisions 
Open to hearing about opinions and 
points of view contrary to their 
own, but pushes or drives own 
ways of doing things. 
Does not attempt to 
understand others’ 
situations, backgrounds or 
points of view 
Do what we say we will do 
and deliver on our promises 
Stands by commitments and promises 
and exceeds expectations when 
delivering on them  
Displays actions that are 
consistent with their words and 
delivers on commitments  
Keeps to their word some of the 
time and delivers on some 
commitments 
Does not keep to their word, 
and fails to deliver on 
commitments 
Speak up and have open, 
honest and constructive 
conversations  
Has open and honest conversations 
with others even when they are tough, 
and does this in a manner that respects 
and supports others 
Has open, honest and constructive 
conversations 
Has open and honest conversation 
that are not constructive or 
supportive 
Does not have open and 
honest conversations with 
others 
Encourage others to share 
their ideas and actively listen 
to, and respect their ideas 
Goes above and beyond to seek out and 
listen to ideas and contributions from a 
diverse group of people 
Encourages others to contribute 
and listens to and considers 
others’ ideas and contributions 
Listen to and shows an interest in 
others’ ideas and contributions 
when it is beneficial to them 
Does not listen to or respect 
others’ ideas or encourage 
others to share 
Is Work Together 
Work collaboratively and 
support others to achieve the 
right outcome for our 
customers and organisation 
Looks beyond own business area and 
actively seeks out and supports others 
to achieve the right outcomes 
Works collaboratively and 
cohesively with others to achieve 
the right outcome 
Works with and supports others to 
achieve the right outcomes when 
prompted or asked 
Works in isolation and 
focuses on own tasks and 
rarely offers to help others 
Share ideas, knowledge and 
experience across the 
organisation 
Actively connects with others across 
business areas and beyond the 
organization to share ideas, knowledge 
and experience  
Openly shares ideas, knowledge 
and experience with others across 
the business areas 
Shares ideas, knowledge or 
experience when asked to do so 
Reluctant to share ideas, 
knowledge and experience 
with others 
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Do what is right for the 
customer, community and 
organization, putting aside 
own agenda 
Makes own decisions and encourages 
others to make decisions that support 
our customer, community or 
organizational needs 
Makes decisions that take the 
customer, community or  
organisational needs into account 
Makes decisions that take the 
customer, community or  
organisational needs into account 
when prompted to do so 
Makes decisions that is 
guided  by personal agenda 
rather than customer, 
community or  
organisational goals 
Connect employees, 
customers and the 
community to help them 
achieve their outcomes 
Actively identifies and connects 
networks of individuals with common 
needs or interests to help them achieve 
their outcomes 
Identifies and connects networks 
of individuals within own 
business area to help them 
achieve their outcomes 
Identifies and connects networks of 
individuals within own business 
area to help them achieve their 
outcomes when prompted to do so 
Does not attempt to connect 
others with common needs 
Create Value Through Excellence 
Be passionate about creating 
value through high  
standards of performance 
Consistently delivers value, and 
challenges self and others to deliver 
exceptional outcomes 
Sets high personal standards of 
performance and delivers 
consistently high quality 
outcomes 
“Ticks the box” and completes 
assigned tasks with limited 
consideration for the outcome or 
standard of work 
Does not set high personal 
standards of performance 
Be action oriented and 
innovate to find better ways 
of doing things to exceed our 
customer expectations 
Actively connects with others, 
internally and externally, to find new 
ways of doing things that exceed our 
customers expectations 
Finds new ways of doing things 
that build on others’ ideas to 
achieve better outcomes 
Implements limited improvements 
in own area when prompted to do 
Does not make any 
suggestions for 
improvements 
Use quality data and facts to 
make decisions that consider 
risks and deliver sustainable 
performance for our 
organisation 
Seeks out quality data and facts and 
takes into account risks and long term 
scenarios when making decisions 
Makes sound business decisions 
based on quality data and facts 
and considers key risks 
Makes decisions using available 
data and facts but does not consider 
risks and longer term business 
impacts 
Makes decisions with little 
or no consideration of data, 
facts or consequences 
Reward, recognise and 
celebrate high levels of 
achievement and success 
Openly acknowledges and celebrates 
strong performance in others and uses 
others’ achievements as a point of 
reference 
Recognises strong performance 
and encourages and supports 
celebrating individual and team 
success 
Acknowledges good performance 
in others but does not celebrate 
individual or team success 
Does not recognise or 
celebrate individual or team 
achievements 
Act like owners of the 
business and take 
accountability   for issues, 
decisions and actions that 
matter for our customers and 
community 
Takes initiative and personal 
accountability for driving decisions or 
actions that matter; Steps up to take 
accountability for both positive and 
negative outcomes, and for correcting 
mistakes 
Takes accountability for making 
decisions or taking action without 
being prompted; Accepts 
accountability for outcomes 
Takes accountability for issues, 
decisions or actions when prompted 
to do so 
Does not take accountability 
for issues, decisions and 
actions 
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Fourthly and consequently, given the nebulous and subjective nature of the defined 
behaviours and related ratings, the question can be posed of how might a rating be 
contested when perceived by an employee to be unfair or inaccurate? Formal mechanisms 
for a challenge to, or appeal against, a rating do not appear to be provided by any of the 
organisations in this study.  
 
Similar importance was placed upon behaviours in the other organisations. In Bank C, for 
example, the behaviours included, 
 
…things like achieving excellence, building understanding and trust, finding 
solutions, communicating, developing people and so on, and the levels that they 
were set at were really high. (Bank C, Senior Seconded Rep.) 
 
Union respondents provided insight into the purpose and effects of Performance 
Management behaviours, particularly in that they were used to justify actions against 
individual employees.  
 
The behaviours’ rating is another layer they are adding on which will go towards 
your overall rating and whether you get a pay increase and then by how much. So 
the behaviour rating is being used to dilute the pay increases or the bonuses 
people get. Now each role emphasises different scorecard elements so if you are a 
banking adviser your scorecard will be made up of your sales in particular areas, 
like insurance, personal loans. And then it would be about how your behave with 
your customer, how organised you are and even how tidy you are. (Bank B, 
National Officer)  
 
Increasingly, a reliance on numerical or quantitative targets has given way to a situation 
where these are combined with an array of qualitative evaluations of performance.  
 
The most obvious example is customer service. Two or three years ago probably 
80% of the emphasis was on performing on your targets, and perhaps 10% was on 
customer service. But that balance has changed now, so there is a much greater 
emphasis now on what it is they’re delivering to the customer, how are we 
communicating, what we stand for as a bank, and how you as an individual is 
relecting that in meeting your scorecard objectives. (Bank B, National Officer) 
 
Other respondents from the banking sector commented that the widespread introduction 
of Performance Management practices indicates that the banks or, more specifically, 
groups of senior managers within the banks, share strategic and practical knowledge. 
 
They share a lot of stuff through these forums, the market-based remuneration 
strategy certainly. And I would imagine that the enterprise people framework, 
applying the bell curve, is also driven from that sharing of information with 
between LBG and RBS. (Bank C, National Officer) 
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Although the financial crisis of 2007-8 did not initiate these rigorous forms of 
performance management, it sharpened the focus as ‘tackling underperformance became 
the number one priority’ (Bank B National Officer).  
 
Monitoring employee performance in all of its aspects involves an enormous 
commitment of managerial and supervisory time and resources. Union officers report that 
already overstretched FLMs are increasingly complaining about the additional demands 
that Performance Management are placing on them.   
 
And you have to ask the question, how can branch managers cope with much 
more than they are at the moment, because it is a huge ask on them in a number of 
areas in a busy branch with lower staffing numbers on top of everything else. The 
bureaucracy is incredible. (Bank B National Officer) 
 
7.3 Distinction Between Performance Management and Performance Improvement 
 
Respondents perceptively highlighted the distinction between Performance Management 
as part of the overall HR approach and the more specific Performance Improvement 
initiatives. The real bite to Performance Management, insofar as corrective actions, 
disciplinary intent and the dismissal of underperformers are concerned, has come from 
the relatively recent introduction of performance improvement initiatives, however they 
are described.  
 
Respondents from Bank B provided the clearest example of performance improvement 
initiatives how they had transformed PM into a disciplinary mechanism. The Bank had 
introduced a new Individual Improvement Plan (IIP) in 2009 to replace the older 
Performance Improvement Procedure (PIP). Commonly known by union representatives 
as ‘Son of PIP’, it represented a further step change in managerial action against 
individuals who had been defined as ‘underperformers’.  
 
Managers did not really use the old procedure even though we used to argue about 
it. If individuals were pursued under the old programme it might take as long as 
18-months to exit people from the organization. Now under the new system it 
takes 6 months from start to finish. Previously, there was a four stage process, 
now it has been reduced to three. In Integrated Financial Solutions, the wealth 
generating part of the business, the area where the bank are really interested these 
days and not the mass market, over the last year an awful lot of people have been 
getting exited for not meeting their targets (Bank B National Officer).  
 
The senior workplace rep of Bank B articulated ‘the two sides to what they call 
performance management’, as follows. 
 
One side has to do what would old fashionedly have been an appraisal system 
which was concerned with individualising pay, distributing managerially defined 
rewards and then having objectives set, normally imposed, not negotiated which 
was meant to be measurable but often was and is not. Then there is the other side, 
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which is performance improvement which is the ongoing monitoing of someone’s 
performance. While the former side was seen as part of the reward system, the 
latter side is seen as more than a black mark, very much a punishment tool and 
something to be feared (Bank B Senior Workplace Rep). 
 
Although, as observed, performance management may have existed in different forms for 
a number of years, union respondents agreed that it became a concern for their members 
when companies extensively used performance improvement plans that carried 
disciplinary consequences. For example, 
 
I really began to feel that Performance Management was a problem when, instead 
of dealing with one case every now and again, suddenly we were being inundated 
with members having been put on a PIP, Performance Improvement Plan. 
(Telecoms, CWU Clerical Branch Officer) 
 
7.4  The Cascading Down of Targets  
 
The targets imposed upon employees through the cascading downwards of KPIs are not 
static and are subject to change. As the overall needs of the business change targets 
escalate and work intensifies. Respondents indicated how workers had been compelled to 
respond to changing oragnisational priorities and emphases. For example,  
 
The elements of the scorecard change, usually every year, but the strategic 
objectives can change by the month to reflect what the bank’s drive is. At the 
moment in retail, they have something called ‘customer experience’, trying to re-
invigorate bank branches and branch manegers to go back out and be seen as the 
face of the community, like your old-style bank manager. (Bank B, National 
Officer) 
 
It was widely reported that managers lack discretion, as they have to implement the 
targets imposed on them from above.  
 
If you’ve got a strong manager who is willing to kick back there could be an 
adjustment, but that would only be to a minor extent and that would be the 
exception. (Bank A, National Officer).  
 
Respondents reported that line managers’ restricted ability to exercise discretion was 
complelling them to behave with less sensivity towards employees. 
 
Members are coming to me and saying, ‘This has happened to me before and my 
boss was alright about it, but now they are becoming heavy-handed’. It’s much 
tighter now and managers are harsher, (Voluntary Sector National Officer, Unite 
the Union)  
  
Bullying is happening not because of the traits and charcteristics of an individual 
manager, but because the manager is working to orders. They are under pressure 
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to deliver by whatever means and, frequently, that transforms itself into 
dysfunctional behavior. In retail, for example, I heard recently that the district 
manager is looking at the results of all the branch managers and then calls them 
individually if they haven’t met their target for that date. And they’ve got to 
account for that. How can people cope with that kind of pressure? (Bank B 
National Officer) 
 
7.5 Escalating Targets, Work Intensification and Lean 
 
As several interviewees indicated, targets were used, not as a mechanism to capture more 
business, but essentially as an ‘anti-employee device’.  
 
It has been the old adage, that if you get a target and you hit it it goes up by ten or 
twenty per cent for the next year,. They are still using all the positive words that 
you would expect the company to use but it was the stick approach to make sure 
that you remain motivated. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
Respondents testified to a dramatic culture change and a huge increase in the intensity of 
work across the organisations for which they were responsible. One national union 
officer recalled how it had been common practice in Bank of Scotland branches prior to 
the merger that brought HBOS into being for staff to have coffee and scones at 10 am 
every morning. When she visited these branches as part of her remit she would be invited 
to these sessions, which enabled her to talk to staff and thus play an important role in 
employee-manager communications. Following merger, these tea breaks became a thing 
of the past, 
 
…Halifax didn’t take tea breaks because of the sales culture of mortgages, so they 
tried to do away with them. So we had to do away with tea breaks, call them 
refreshement breaks and get some guidelines in for them. (Bank A, National 
Officer) 
 
Both officers and workplace reps reported that work intensification was related to lean 
working. In Bank A, workers being pushed ‘harder and harder’ in a number of functions 
but particularly in the ‘back office areas’, an experience shared by workers in other 
organisations. Often lean was introduced without being discussed with the union as it 
should have according to union agreements by which significant changes in work 
organization should be subject to consultation, if not negotiation.  
 
From being introduced into units of two or three workers, we now find that lean 
invades every aspect of the bank’s work. But we never hear how changes as, for 
example, with the customer experience programme, are tied up with lean. We 
only hear from members’ feedback when they complain and say, ‘Oh well, you 
know, that’s because of lean’.  Lean is being introduced through the back door. 
For example, we just found out that in the collections department a number of 
people being seconded to a lean project and part of the end objective is that jobs 
will go. (Bank B National Officer).  
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In the lean processes they’ve got whiteboards for everyone to know what each 
other is doing. So there’s that and there’s the intensification, or whatever you 
want to call it, there’s the humiliation of it, your name’s on the whiteboard, and if 
you are having an offday it’s shown because your performance is broken down 
into chunks for every two or three hours. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
Lean was also introduced in Bank C as part of a broader programme of cost-cutting and 
driving efficiency gains.  
 
The continuous improvement or lean model was about creating the space in the 
workplace so that the company could get more out of people for less. And the by-
product was an increase in customer service, a reduction in call times and in turn 
around times. This was lean, understaffing was clearly important, continuous 
improvement, trying to get workers to ‘up their game’ was the language used. 
And competitiveness between centres emerged. If Glasgow was making 
improvements in their call centre, then Edinbugh should be doing it as well, if not 
performing better. (Bank C, Senior Seconded Rep) 
 
One element in the reported work intensification was the introduction in financial 
services companies of ‘stretch’ or ‘stretching targets’.  In the context of understaffing, 
these targets which were onerous even in the most favourable circumstances, and caused 
‘people to get into difficulties, make mistakes and be disciplined’ (Bank B National 
Officer).  
 
The experience of field engineers working in telecommunications is of the relatively 
recent implementation of an array of monitoring deveices that are now used to measure 
work times and in the process secure conformance to prescribed targets. The 
consequences for workers, according to this fomer field engineer and regional  officer 
have been profound, especially in respect of the aggressive targets that have eroded 
employee discretion and undermined organizational trust.  
 
The particular noose on working time is tightening all the time. They are plugging 
even the smallest holes in the working day. Controls manifest themselves in a 
series of alerts to engineers and managers target them on how well they respond 
and answer their alerts. The alerts are about why an engineer is in a place when 
they should be somewhere else, or why they have not moved within a certain 
period of time. There’s pressure on two people now, on whoever is working on 
control because they are being targeted and on the guy in the field because he is 
constantly being phoned up and asked what is he doing. Of course, it might be 
perfectly legitimate, but that is a pressure that people do not like and complain 
about bitterly. (Telecoms, Regional Officer).  
 
On the clerical side, targets had been integral to operations since the inception of contact 
centres. The CWU Branch Officer described the evolution of targets within BT, but 
observed that a distinct change occurred during the summer of 2008, when there was an 
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increase in disciplinary cases, as Performance Management became ‘a rod over peoples’ 
backs’. The source of the pressure was the bundling together of targets into OPI (Overall 
Performance Indicators), against which employees’ individual performance was being 
evaluated.  
   
The implementation of Performance Management systems and, within them, the 
imposition of increasingly demanding targets, appear to be characteristic not merely of 
financial services and telecommunicatioins, the sectors subject to the most intensive 
research, but more generally even if not explicitly described as such. A national officer of 
Unite the Union with responsibility for the voluntary sector reported, 
 
I work predominantly within local authorities and the voluntary and not-for-profit 
sector. Performance Management is not necessarily a term that is used, but it is a 
way of management that is used to make sure that people speed up and are hitting 
new targets, or that the duties are carried out to certain more tightly prescribed 
standards. (National Officer Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union) 
 
7.6 The Bell Curve  and Forced Distribution 
 
Interviewees reported that senior management mostly denied that the Bell Curve operated 
in their organization. On the occasions that they reluctantly coneceded that if it was 
utilised, they claimed it was only for indicative and not disciplinary puroposes. The 
principal reason for this reticence lies in the fact that the Bell Curve, and the forced 
distribution integral to it, ranks employees according to a pre-existing statistical 
classification and not to actual ‘performance’. As a consequence, it is vulnerable to 
accusations of inequity and to the specific charge that so-called underperformers are 
unfairly identified.  
 
In fact, there is both factual and testimony evidence that the Bell Curve operates in 
organizations, such as in Banks B and C, as is evidenced by the numerical distributions 
for the five categories of performance (Table 5). In other organizations the circumstantial 
evidence is strong that a priori distributions are utilised.  
 
Bank C, for example, frequently refers to the fact that individuals would be ranked not 
merely in terms of their results against tagets but also ‘relative to your peer group’. More 
definitively, the Bank provided employees with the ‘numbers of employees expected to 
receive performace ratings’. For an organization which formally disavows the use of 
forced distribution, its communications with employees undermine this claim insofar as 
percentages are allocated to each rating. As can be seen (Table 5), the percentages for 
Bank A might be ‘flexible’, but still indicate a priori distribution.  
 
Additional evidence attesting to this practice comes from Bank C’s employee 
communications. Here the Bank specifies that line managers allocate ratings based upon 
the three criteria of ‘results compared to objectives’, ‘competencies and behaviours’ and 
‘your performance relative to your peer group’. Following this exercise, ratings should 
then ‘follow an expected distribution curve [which] tells us the proportion of people that 
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fall into each rating level when we look at ratings across any large team, department or 
division’. Remarkably, given the bank’s formal disavowal of the Bell Curve, the 
document then illustrates the ‘actual distribution’ of rankings for the bank’s employees 
plotted against the ‘expected distribution’ (Digram 4). Bank C is admitting to an ‘actual’ 
performance distribution that is strikingly similar to the a priori statistical distribution of 
the Bell Curve.  
 
Table 5: Banks B and C: Distribution of Rankings 
BANK B Rating 
E 
Rating 
D 
Rating 
C 
Rating 
B 
Rating 
A 
 
Definition Unacceptable  Does not meet 
expectations 
Meets  
expectations 
Exceeds 
expectations 
Exceptional Not applicable 
Proportion 5% 15% 60% 15% 5%  
 
BANK C 
Rating 
1 
Rating 
2 
Rating 
3 
Rating 
4 
Rating 
5 
Rating 
0 
Definition Performance  
unacceptable  
One or more key 
objectives not met 
Fully achieved key 
objectives 
All objectives fully 
achieved and some 
have been exceeded 
throughout the year 
All objectives have 
been exceeded 
throughout the year 
New start or 
inapplicable 
Comparator  Individuals 
performance 
compares less 
favourably relative 
to their peer group 
Individual’s 
performance is in 
line with the 
majority of their 
peer group 
Individuals 
performance 
compares more 
favourably relative 
to their peer group 
 Insufficient 
time has 
elapsed to 
allow a true 
assessment of 
performance 
Proportion 0-5% 
of employees 
5-20% 
of employees 
55-65% 
0f employees 
15-25% 
of employees 
0-5% 
of employees 
 
 
 
Diagram 4: Bank C ‘Expected Performance Ratings Distribution Curve’ 
 
 
In some organisations, the Bell Curve had been introduced abruptly while in others senior 
management had made a number of attempts at bringing it in, having to overcome the 
opposition of the trade union.  
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They were trying to introduce it [the Bell Curve] in 2008 into HBOS, but I don’t 
know long it has been used in LTSB. It was 20 per cent, 60 per cent and 20 per 
cent – and we rejected it outright. It did not mean that the bottom 20 per cent 
would be put out the door, but they would be getting extra attention (Bank A 
National Officer) 
 
National union officers and representatives understood that, whilst the ultimate aim of 
Performance Management was and remains the imperative of increasing control over 
workers with the aim of increasing productivity, an important element in achieving the 
ultimate objective was making managers more accountable for the performance of 
workers for whom they were responsible.  
 
What they were trying to do was to make managers more accountable, so that 
they would say to workers, ‘Here’s what we want you to adhere to’.  (Bank A 
National Officer) 
 
Both the seconded rep and lay members of Bank C reported similarly on how the Bell 
curve operates.  
 
The language is quite specific. ‘You have not achieved, you are an 
underachiever’. People are being marginalized, criticsed for letting people down, 
letting the team down, letting the bank down. Undeneath it is the Bell Curve, 
despite the protestations from the higher echelons, by which a certain percentage 
of people are rated as below achieving. They state that they only use it as an 
indication, but is is applied absolutely and to the letter. If you looked at a team of 
20 people, maybe two would get a 1, four would get a 2, four would get a 4, two 
would get a 5 and the rest would get a 3. The 1s and the 2s would get kicked and 
they wouldn’t get a pay rise. Even 3s might not get an increase because the pay 
pot is fixed and if individuals have reached their maximum salary, there’s no 
money available. (Bank C Senior Seconded Rep) 
 
Sometimes the inflexibility in the distributions of ratings led to quite farcical situations 
when work units were small or teams were composed of limited numbers of employees.  
 
…it’s too fixed, there’s no flexibility in the Bell curve. You could have a branch 
of the bank that employed 5 people that was one of the most successful in the 
country, but one of the staff would have to be ‘not satisfactory’. (Bank A National 
Officer) 
 
I’ve got responsibility for half a dozen people who work very closely as a team, 4 
full-time and 2 part-time. I was asked to put put the six into the five categories, 1 
and 1 at the bottom, 2 in the middle and then 1 and 1 at the top – a bit like 
Countdown!! I couldn’t do that because everyone is a good team member and we 
always hit our targets. There’s no way that I could give someone an 
underperformaing rating – I just could not do it. I told them that but it was a big 
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problem which escalated all the way to senior management. (Bank A, discussion 
reps meeting, 16 November 2011) 
 
Not only has the pressure on underachievers intensified, the criteria included within the 
definition of underperforming has changed. In some organizations larger numbers of 
employees are now categorsied as underperforming.  
 
From early 2009 onwards, the bell curve and underperformance took on a whole 
new meaning. ‘A one or two rating should always indicate a less than acceptable 
performance’. To get a level 2 rating – which means you haven’t achieved – all an 
employee needs to do is have one or more key objectives not achieved. So you 
could be a star and exceed in all areras but in that one key objective, which is 
probably sales, you go below target and you become an underperformer overall. 
(Bank C Senior Seconded Rep). 
 
In order to ensure that the number of employees in each respective category corresponds 
to the pre-determined ratio, organizations undertake various ‘moderating’ or ‘levelling’ 
processes. In Bank C, for example, this has been described as a ‘round table process’, and 
in Bank A for a period it was termed ‘grandparenting’. Despite terminological variation, 
the process is a common one.  Managers or team leaders who have responsibility for 
attributing performance scores to their team members meet with their own senior 
managers who then evaluate the ratings they have given. The justification for this stage of 
the Performance Management process as given to employees is that it ensures that 
consistency and fairness is achieved in the evaluation of their performance. However, the 
experiences of respondents led them to believe that the fundamental, albeit unstated, 
rationale was to enforce the Bell Curve, given the fact that forced distribution is 
inseparably bound up with allocating the fixed ‘pot’ of money made available for 
individual pay awards.  
 
An ancillary objective, them, is to curb discretion and to ensure that team leaders do not 
‘inflate’ the ratings they give to subordinates. Preventing or correcting indulgent 
behaviour on the part of FLMs is as important as – indeed integral to – the imposition of 
a priori forced distribution on employees themselves.  
 
The round table process is another layer of scrutiny and control. So a senior 
manager will say to a FLM, ‘You’ve given that individual Fully Competent. Can 
you demonstrate to me why he is Fully Competent when he’s only sold 5 credit 
cards and he should have sold 25. He doesn’t deserve that rating’. So everybody is 
checked through the round table process in each of the divisions by the more 
senior managers. The Bell Curve is used by the round table people, although they 
won’t admit it. We know that out of ten people, they’ve got to put two in the 
Unsatisfactory or Needs Improvement categories, so they will look at the people 
they’ve got and say ‘Right, which one is vulnerable here, which two are 
vulnerable there’ and knock them out of the process (Bank B National Officer) 
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Respondents from the CWU reported that the Bell curve was used in the telecom sector 
in the distribution of appraisal scores and the targeting of underperformers. 
 
It’s the same in BT. You’ve got the ‘needs improvement’ people and they are the 
people who are being targeted. They use the Bell curve in what they call a 
levelling process where the managers meet and decide on some kind of standard 
which will dictate who is to be useless, who is to be excellent. While they deny 
that it is a forced distribution it is of course and they are lying through their teeth. 
It is fair enough if someone genuinely needs improvement and the company uses 
this to make sure managers put in place what needs to be done to improve 
performance. But what we have seen recently is that ‘generally satisfactory’ 
people are now being deemed not good enough. These levelling meetings occur 
because the company has got pressure to reduce its resource and there is a no 
redundancy policy. The Bell Curve and forced distribution are used as a 
justification for putting the fear of God into people to work harder and to get rid 
of people without having to pay out. In BT it is very difficult to get a handle on 
exactly how much of this is going on across the company. We have taken the 
issue to meetings with the Chief Executive and, according to him, the numbers 
exited have been very small. (Telecoms, CWU Regional Secretary) 
 
There is evidence that managers are taking advantage of workers’ unwillingness to 
openly challenge the ratings even when perceived to be demonstrably unfair. Managers 
might manipulate individuals’ insecurity in order to gain acquiescence.  
 
What they’ve said is, if you take this rating then we’ll do a performance plan that 
you will manage and you’ll be fine next year, so people were feeling ‘I don’t want 
to put my head above the parapet and and start appealing this, because I will be 
fine next year’. We don’t get a lot of people appealing their performance 
management rating, which shocks us because we know what is going on in parts 
of the bank where the Bell Curve is enforced far more rigorously (Bank A, 
National Officer) 
 
7.7  Underperformance and Managed Exits 
 
One national officer reported that while the company admitted to operating the Bell 
Curve, they insisted that it was used only as a guideline. However, the union had received 
intelligence that ‘HR targets were to manage the bottom five per cent out of the business’. 
As a result, HR would support any line manager who attempted to implement this target.   
 
In was in this period [after the merger] that we began to get cases of people being 
managed out of the door. Nothing like the extent to which it is happening today of 
course. You would have had to have been a lot worse than you would need to be 
today. Between the two companies, for 2009, I think the stats were that about 700 
people were managed out of the door. (Bank A National Officer) 
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The Senior Seconded Rep at Bank C provided a graphic account of how performance 
management hardened its disciplinaryeffects over time.  
 
Like everything else they introduced a model of managing people which squeezed 
everything out of people - squeezed the sponge dry in a sense – but they then had 
to rack it up again and this is when we saw the introduction (2006-2007) of 
disciplining people for poor performance and then the pressure to exit people. We 
had never seen this before. (Bank C, Senior Seconded Rep) 
 
The ease and speed with which ‘people were being managed out’ differed from 
organization to organization according to reports. However, the account of managerial 
practice in Bank C is quite typical of organizations across financial services and 
telecoms. 
 
If only one area of your performance is a weaknesss – and the majority are about 
sales - then then you can be put on an action contract, now called an action plan, 
which can be either four weeks in length or six weeks. From the day of signing 
that action contract to out of the door can be as little as 12 weeks. So pressure is 
being applied on people who can’t meet their targets to take a downgrading in 
their job. This is not just for customer-facing roles, but across the board 
(Workplace Rep, 22 April 2010) 
 
Union officers reported a significant increase in the number of compromise agreements. 
As the CIPD (2011: 10), compromise agreements, which have become extremely popular 
in recent years, are generally made on the termination (or proposed) termination of 
employment, ‘under which the employer makes a payment to the employee in return for 
the employee agreeing not to pursue any claim they may have to an employment 
tribunal’. In this CIPD survey, more than two-thirds of company repondents (70 per cent) 
stated that they had made use of such agreements in the last two years ‘even in the 
absence of an existing claim’. The most common reason for the use of compromise 
agreements was ‘in order to remove an employee on grounds of poor performance or 
misconduct, without the risk of legal challenge’. The second most common reason was 
‘to avoid legal challenge in relation to redundancy’, amplified to denote organisations’ 
desire to remove individuals ‘without having to follow policies, procedures and the law 
when there isn’t a genuine redundancy or performance issue’.  
 
The primary evidence confirms these trends. Respondents reported the widespread use of 
compromise agreements as a ‘shocking development’, by which workers were 
increasingly subject to poor performance management ratings, placed on performance 
improvement programmes and then pressurised – directly or indirectly - to sign such 
agreements and accept minimal payments. Organisations were thus able to reduce 
headcount, downsize and restructure, while avoiding the more onerous obligation of 
pursuing redundancy procedures and the possibility of employees seeking redress through 
an employment tribunal. This national officer recounted the following common 
occurrence, 
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Staff tell us that they are getting penalised but it is impossible for them to meet 
their targets because of the unfavourable if not impossible business environment. 
And they are told by managers, ‘Oh well, we can go through this procedure 
[compromise agreement] or you could leave’. And quite frankly, we get people 
phoning us up saying, ‘They’ve given me one month’s money, do you think I 
should go?’. I say, ‘No, don’t’. It was OK when it was boom time, now they’re 
using any pretext to get rid of them. If they are not union members and the union 
does not get involved, then they are getting them out the door on peanuts. (Bank B 
National Officer) 
 
Similar practices were reported for the telecoms sector, particularly by union officers 
responsible for clerical workers in BT Retail.  
 
BT brought in what was called a compromise deal, a three month compromise 
deal. When people were put under so much duress they believed that they were no 
longer capable of doing their job. People would be taken aside by managers who 
would say, ‘We can help you, here’s a three months package to go’ and they were 
so demotivated that they were jumping to take it. (Telecoms CWU Clerical 
Branch Officer) 
 
The evidence suggests that managed exits have become common with large numbers of 
workers being threatened with the unpalatable choice of, ‘You can leave quietly now with 
a sum, or leave later with nothing and a bad reference’ (Bank B Workplace Rep). The 
spread of the practice extends beyond financial services and telecoms. The union officer 
for the voluntary and non-for-profit sector who negotiated with six of the largest 
organisations in that sector, identified both the causal chain deriving from government 
cuts and the consequences for employees.  
 
From the national level – the government – to local authorities there are budgetary 
cutbacks which have a knock-on effect on the voluntary sector which has to cut by 
10 per cent in order to deliver a service. One of the ways they save is by managing 
people out of the door. If alleged performance is not up to speed then people will 
get a verbal warning, then they will get a written warning and before they know it 
they are going from zero to out of the door in as little as twelve weeks. I have got 
50 reps in these six organisations, some of them renowned organisations, and they 
are reporting these instances more and more. The trigger to managed exits is often 
restructuring and reorganization of work. Some have talked about lean. Personally 
I have dealt with cases of experienced managers and team leaders being managed 
out of the organization. (National Officer Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union). 
 
In telecoms managed exits were reported as being commonplace in both the engineering 
and clerical sides of the industry.  
 
The process that begins with the managed exit begins with workers not reaching 
their targets, which triggers a one-to-one interview, the performance management 
strategy which starts off with managers saying, ‘We will help you, we will make 
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it better for you, this is about improving you. So then they set an informal stage. 
Within six weeks if you do not come up to scratch you are moved onto the formal 
stage. In most of the processes on the formal stage, you could be sacked within 30 
weeks. That is an horrendous pressure for anyone trying to make an improvement 
to their work position. (CWU National Officer4) 
 
The CWU Branch Officer confirned that ‘managed exits’ had been deliberately practiced 
by some managers within a clerical section of BT.  
 
It happened on the retail side a few years ago. The people coming into 
management positions were not those who were supportive of the teams and 
treated people like individuals, but were the type who when they were under the 
cosh from above were punitive rather than positive. An email went out from one 
of the senior managers, which I read, that said that even though our staff might be 
nice people our customers come first and if people were not performing then it 
was important to get them out.  These managers were encouraged to performance 
manage people out of the building.  When workers weren’t cutting the mustard, to 
use their words, they used used measurements to get them exited out of the 
building. (Telecoms, CWU Clerical Branch Secretary)  
 
The suspicion amongst union officers certainly was that BT was trying reduce the 
number of longer-serving employees on ‘older’ contracts who had good terms and 
conditions and were set to receive reasonable pensions.  
 
Performance Management at Telco - Interview with Former Human Resource Manager  
 
I joined Telco in 1986 and worked in personnel/HR, leaving in 2010 by which time I had become a middle 
manager. Although an HRM generalist, I had taken a lead role in Performance Management. It was because I 
totally disagreed with the way that Performance Management was being implemented that I decided to leave. 
 
What lies behind Performance Management is a serious drive to reduce costs. For example, in Telco schemes 
were historically constructed in such a way that if employees are made compulsorily redundant it’s like winning 
the pools, the terms are generous. So to avoid this cost, Performance Management was adopted as the strategy to 
get rid of people, a way of moving people out of the organisation. It started about three years ago (2007). The 
five Performance Management bands are: ‘development needed’, ‘needs improvement’, ‘meets expectations’, 
‘above expectations’ and ‘excellent’. 
 
First, in early 2008, the company started producing Performance Management league tables of different groups 
of employees. For example, there would be league tables for the 3,000 field engineers, which would include data 
on the numbers of sickness absence cases and Performance Management cases. We were able to see how well 
they were performing against other groups. We were at the bottom of the league table, a position that was 
exposed by this strategy. 
 
Second, later in 2008, a new Director was appointed with responsibility for field engineers. We were told we 
were not moving people out as quickly as the organisation had hoped. This manager would speak to other 
managers, basically a fortnightly inquisition on how effectively managers were dealing with sickness absence 
and Performance Management, and managers would be given targets on how many people they should take out, 
how many employees should have managed exit. These fortnightly meetings were about levelling the scores, so 
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senior managers had to identify the lowest performers. The message was clear, ‘If you don’t manage people out 
of the organisation, then you will get managed out yourself’. Last year, we had two managers leave because they 
couldn’t take the strain, they couldn’t face putting the Performance Management pressure on other workers. 
 
Field engineers would get low Performance Management scores if they did not keep their van tidy, did not 
complete computer-based training on time, did not contribute enough to Performance Management discussions 
or team meetings. Sickness absence figures were used in the calculations. Sickness absence figures did rise and 
we had a very high percentage. The Bradford Factor was introduced two and a half years ago. More than 10 days 
or 4 separate absences would trigger a sickness absence discussion.  
 
We were being asked to find grounds to get rid of people without having to pay for it. If we could not find them, 
we would have to make up the grounds for managed exits. In my section of 80, 9 people were managed out of 
the organisation on performance grounds. The senior manager wore this as a badge of honour. There was a 
woman manager who went off sick in a really bad way, crying all the time. There were two cases, one of a 
person who was diagnosed with psychological depression, the other who had a brain tumour, who were put back 
on performance improvement when they returned from illness. One good thing was that this senior manager was 
moved. He had used intemperate language. He had threatened that if a particular manager did not sack another 
manager, then he would. A grievance was taken out against him and he was moved, but his behaviour would 
never have tolerated at all in the past. 
 
They always said that there was forced distribution of employees under Performance Management. Unions  were 
beginning to get so many cases of employees with grievances arising out of Performance Management, that they 
raised the issue formally with the company. Following union complaints, Telco promised that there would be a 
culture change within the organisation. However, managers in Telco tell me that the culture is still one where the 
company is intent on saving money by hoping people will accept a small payment and go, rather than wait and 
get a pension. There’s a lot of people, including senior managers who do not believe that the company has 
changed its practices even though the supposed new approach to Performance Management came in after 1st 
April 2010.  
 
Increasing numbers of people are going off sick. Many are working harder and harder because they are worried 
at ending up at the bottom of the performance management heap. And this makes them sick. Last year when I 
was a Prospect rep I had a member who hanged himself in a telephone exchange, because the pressures of work 
had become so intense. The pressure of avoiding becoming a poor performer drives people to work harder and is 
causing mental health problems, some of them serious. There was a great deal of publicity about the 27 suicides 
at France Telecom that were caused by work pressure. Do we want to be in the paper for the same thing? Apart 
from that tragic suicide case, I have had female colleagues breaking down and weeping, I have a man go to 
pieces in front of me. I did not want to be part of this any more especially after the man committing suicide.  
 
On the company website it describes Performance Management as about coaching, developing people and 
improving their performance. Yet, in practice, my ex-colleagues are spending about 80% of their time on action 
of one sort or another against underperformers. What matters is only the last quarter’s Performance Management. 
You can go from being an ‘Excellent’ performer to ‘Development Needed’ within a quarter. The organisation’s 
motive is clear, they are out to get you out. It is a horrible and inhuman way for people to be treated.  
 
They introduced surveillance for field engineers under the duty of care. The GSM calculates the quickest way 
between two jobs. It tracks the movement of the van; for example, when it stops for more than two minutes alerts 
will be triggered in the manager’s office. Under the older system it was a matter of ‘management by consent’, in 
that the engineers would always respond to a request to do a job. The new system when jobs are tightly timed 
and monitored is supposed to save time and money, but the saving is a fallacy. Jobs differ in complexity and the 
length of time they take to complete. They can’t be standardised.  
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I have never met a manager who was supportive of these measures. When employees have commitments - family 
and a mortgage - it is difficult for them to put themselves on the line and stand up to unfair demands. They have 
to perform well at work and make sure that they can keep their job. The organisation always seems to know who 
are the most fragile people who can be picked on. ‘We can give so and so a generally unsatisfactory as they will 
not fight back’ seems to be the mentality.   
 
In Telco the target and, in fact, the ideal was to get underperformers out within 12 weeks. Individuals are given a 
Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) which lasts for four weeks, then if there is no or insufficient improvement, 
a formal warning is issued, then a disciplinary interview, then if no improvement, the final formal warning and 
then if no improvement they are dismissed.  
 
There was quite a sinister practice that we were to use – ‘the car-park conversation’. A manager would be 
expected to take an employee, who had received poor performance score, outside for an informal discussion. The 
manager would then start a conversation along the lines of, ‘You know your last review. It’s only going one way, 
isn’t it? You should perhaps think about coming to an arrangement’. It was important that the manager would 
never make any explicit suggestion that the worker should leave. We were given training in how to conduct these 
kind of conversations; a one-day course on employee relations for HR managers, where we would go through the 
best mechanisms for ensuring that an employee would voluntarily suggest a compromise agreement. As an aside, 
the HRM trainer who delivered the course resigned as he hated having to do it.  
 
7.8    Sickness Absence Management 
 
The interview evidence here confirms the findings of the studies (Ashby and Mahdon, 
2010; Taylor et al, 2010), discussed above (Section 6.7) that stricter sickness absence 
policies and procedures are forcing people to attend work when unwell or to return to 
work prematurely before they have fully recovered. These patterns are evident for both 
the short-term and the long-term sick.  
 
There are cases of staff coming back to work with a heart condition, only because 
of financial difficulties. I also have a case of one woman who was off with real 
mental health problems because she is a single parent. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
The reps and officers responsible for Bank C reported momentous changes in Sickness 
Absence Policies and the deleterious effects for employees. 
 
In absence management you saw the whole caring side of the employer just 
disappear completely. They started to introduce and implement sickness absence 
triggers, sick pay recording, disability sickness absence recording. Return to work 
interviews became very, very important and workers are told quite clearly that if 
they hit the trigger points they will be disciplined. The definition of a trigger point 
is ‘more than four occasions of any length in a calendar year’, so that’s four days 
minimum, or if you are absent for 14 calendar days in one period of absence’. If 
you don’t come to work then they will try and find a way not to pay you. (Bank C, 
Senior Seconded Rep) 
 
According to CWU officers there had certainly been a dramatic change in the policies 
and practices of companies in the telecoimmunications sector.  
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It amounts to bullying people back to work before they are actually ready to come 
back. If you look at the sickness absence policies, why does the manager want to 
go every week and speak to this individual about work when the cause of the 
problem may be the manager or the work? (Telecoms, National Officer 3) 
 
Respondents agreed that while there had been a tightening of the screw in respect of 
sickness absence policy, leading to a far more punitive managerial practice in overall 
terms, outcomes could still vary to a degree depending on the inclinations of individual 
managers and/or the vigilance and effectiveness of particular union reps.  
 
...it’s about whether you’ve got a good rep or whether you’ve got a good manager 
as to how quickly you get exited out of the company. We’ve got really good 
stories about how they’ve managed to get the company to see sense and manage 
people properly for their absences, but we’ve got some horror stories that we are 
getting involved in. People can be managed out of the door over sickness absence 
in as little as three months (Bank A National Officer) 
 
7.9   Effects on Employees 
 
Interviewees reported the negative consequences of Performance Management, 
particularly when it was associated with the introduction and implementation of lean 
working. The unrelenting intensity of work generated unprecedented levels of pressure.  
 
If your name’s up on the whiteboard, you’ll have emails going around saying who 
is performing badly and who is performing well, who is red, who is amber, who is 
green, that kind of thing, so the pressure is very intense and it really does effect 
people badly. (Bank A, National Officer) 
 
Union reps reported that particular practices had aggravated problems for employees. In 
one organization, it was reported that cabbages and cauliflowers had been placed on the 
desks of individuals who had been identified as underperformers. Although union 
intervention had stopped this practice, officers reported that the company was finding 
‘other ways of embarrassing and humiliating people’.  
 
We have had instances where, if a branch was not doing well, the regional 
manager would speak to every person in the branch and say, ‘You never hit your 
target yesterday, so what are you going to do different today so that you hit your 
target?’  (Bank A National Officer) 
 
The contributions made by reps at union seminars and conferences frequently revealed 
the negative impacts of managerial behaviour associated with Performance Management. 
One common theme was the psychological damage inflicted on some workers. 
 
There has been a culture in our workplace of a few managers using extreme and 
derogatory language. Don’t get me wrong, there are a some pretty decent 
managers but they tend to be overshadowed by the aggressive ones. I mean, it was 
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downright nasty, horrible stuff. ‘Bottom feeders’ when talking about the people 
on the lowest ranking – bottom feeders, muppets – those sort of things. And, for 
some of these people it just reinforced that sense of hopelessness that they were 
not up to the job. (Workplace rep, Change at Work Seminar, 17 May 2011) 
 
A common reported response was for employees to acquiesce when given ratings that 
they did not agree with evern though they were perceived not to reflect accurately and 
fairly their actual performance. The tendency was for workers not to contest, either 
individually or through the unions, unfair ratings hoping that their personal situation 
would improve.  
 
People tend to think, ‘If I don’t put my head up, nobody will see me’, but the 
problem does not got away. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
Very few people challenge it [their rating], because they think it is not worthwhile 
to do so and they prefer to move off the gateway. (Bank B National Officer) 
 
Union officers and reps provided insight into the consequences of strict sickness absence 
management policies.  
 
Massive numbers of people are coming to work when they’re sick. Maybe you 
will get a phone call from some one, and it may shock you as to how senior they 
are. They might be crying ‘I can’t cope, but I’m in the office, what do I do?’ 
(Bank A, National Officer) 
 
The health and safety effects show up in the sickness figures. Also over the last 
year, we’ve had a lot more bullying cases, more than we’ve ever dealt with 
previously. And that is quite frustrating for us because they go nowhere and at 
great cost to the individual’s mental health. (Bank B, National Officer) 
 
Case of a Threatened Suicide 
 
We have many cases where people have real mental health problems, which we would 
say are caused by the pressure and stress of work. We had an incident in one of our 
centres last year where a woman locked herself in a room and said she was going to 
commit suicide. She was under a performance management procedure and she had not 
told her husband. The company was clearly trying to exit her. It was a senior union rep 
who had to go and try to talk her out of it. It was a really, really sad case. (Bank B 
National Officer) 
 
The Senior Seconded rep of Bank C reported that the ‘managed exit’ of an employee 
could be a distressing event for colleagues and for union reps.  
 
They can’t cope with the trauma of people losing their jobs, becasuse the way it is 
done is quite shocking. When someone is dismissed, they immediately have their 
pass taken off them, they are given a black poly bag if they want to go to thedir 
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desk to get their belongings and then they’re escorted out of the building and onto 
the pavement. It’s quite brutal. (Bank C, Senior Seconded Rep) 
 
Union respondents suggested that an increasing number of managers are being negatively 
affected by Performance Management, as a result of the demands placed upon them to 
meet their own targets, and by the strain of ensuring that their subordinates meet theirs. 
These twin sources of pressure are intimately connected.  
 
The prospect of being exited as a result of underperformance undoubtedly induces 
pressure on employees, most notably that it contributes profoundly to employment 
insecurity. Fear of losing ones job emanates not merely from the broader context of crisis, 
recession and, particularly in financial services, downsizing and recession, but also now 
as a result of the insecurity individuals experience from gaining poor performance ratings 
as these are likely to instigate improvement plans that might lead to managed exit. The 
threat of a compromise agreement can contribute in obvious and less obvious ways to 
pressure. The national officer of Bank B, reported that if a higher end finance sector 
worker exited their company with a compromise agreement it would cause reputational 
damage that would hinder their ability to get another job. It was also believed that 
management’s use of compromise agreements was an important factor in the emergence 
of a ‘bullying culture’.  
 
Unite’s national officer for the voluntary sector commented on the pressures increasingly 
felt by employees in the not-for-profit sector.  
 
Anything that is target driven – and that involves more and more areas of work – 
puts huge pressure on people. And if you are getting appraisals or these six 
monthly, quarterly or monthly and sometimes even weekly reviews, depending on 
how far along the process is and what types of structures and policies are in place, 
that is a pressure that people do not need. It’s an unnatural thing to have to deliver 
on. (National Officer Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union).     
 
All respondents recounted the onerous, if not impossible, task that workers faced when 
placed on a formal stage of a performance improvement plan. Rather than encouraging 
‘improvement’, the threat of the ultimate disciplinary sanction of dismissal can have the 
contrary effect of increasing insecurity and incapacitating employees.  
 
It’s a hell of a background to try to work against. ‘If I don’t do this then I will get 
the sack’. My experience has been that people are too busy worrying and looking 
over their shoulder to make the kind of improvements that companies are insisting 
on. Although I have not had that many cases where people have been sacked as a 
result of the procedure, there have been plenty of instances where individuals 
have been shoved over the edge as a direct result of the pressures put on them. 
(CWU, Regional Officer)    
 
Several respondents referred to performance management as a ‘form of bullying’. 
Examples were cited of a common chain of cause and effect upon workers.  
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When workers are taken through conduct and capability performance 
performance, they think that they have been targeted. And then their head goes 
down and they start getting really depressed, they go off sick and it might take 
time but it stops. And then they are in a two-pronged cycle – performance 
management and absence management – and often when they come to us they are 
very damaged. They tell you what they’ve been going through and say, ‘I’m now 
on a written warning. I just couldn’t take it any more. I’ve been to my GP and I’m 
off with work-related stress’. It is a history of all of the triggers that have taken 
place to get this one person into this position within three or four months. 
(National Officer Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union) 
 
The CWU Regional Officer emphasised the contradiction between the formal policies 
and procedures ‘which seem to say all the right things’ and are developmental and 
welefarist in terms of the language used, but in practice for individuals ‘it is like being hit 
by a sledgehammer’. This discrepancy was referred to as ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ 
policies. The combined effects of target driven Performance Management, the punitive 
measures exacted against so-called underperfromers and tough sickness absence policies 
amounted to… 
 
…corporate bullying. What is the justification for constantly chasing someone when 
they are off sick? To claim it is because we are a caring company is a load of 
nonsense. Similarly, when they say that they want to make you better at your job – 
that is only a justification for turning the screw in terms of performance. They use the 
word behaviours, which is a great word that can mean all things to all people, but for 
an HR Manager it is a very specific, even scientific, word about how we put a square 
peg in a square hole and a round peg in a round hole and how if you can’t get them to 
do it fairly quickly then how you can bully them into doing it by using one of the ‘off-
the-shelf’ processes and say, ‘You are not doing this properly, we are putting you on 
that process’, be it absence management, performance management or some other 
process that they can dream up. The intensity now for people in the workplace is so 
great that some people cannot cope with it. At an estimate, I would say that at least 15 
per cent of people seriously struggle with it. (Telecoms, CWU Regional Officer)  
 
It is the view of this officer and his counterparts from financial services, that Performance 
Management affects employees differently. On the one hand, a minority of workers are 
seen to have ‘strong personalities’ and, it is suggested, are dismissive of this new 
managerialism and can withstand the pressures. On the other hand, growing numbers are 
becoming affected psychologically by the constant pressure to perform in terms of 
output, quality and their ‘behavious’. In the words of the CWU Regional Officer this 
growth can be likened to a ‘creeping cancer’. Several respondents reported how the 
relentless intensity of managerial demands and the barrage of information and statistics 
are insidious in their effects. A rep from Bank A reported, ‘Many people don’t realise it is 
happening to them, but they eventually succumb to the pressure’.  
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On the clerical side of BT, respondents reported that, as a result of a significant increase 
in targets and displinary measures, many more advisors were presenting themselves to 
the union with stress symptoms because of the work pressures. A common theme that 
emerged from the interviews and from the contributions made by reps and delegates at 
the union seminars and conferences attended by the author was the way in which even 
experienced employees were internalising the escalating pressures of the job and 
becoming worn down to the point of illness.  
 
They are coming to us complaining that they are not able to sleep and are stressed, 
worrying about their performance. We’re speaking about people who have been with 
the business for 20, 25 or even 30 years. For a period I was getting women and men 
on a daily basis in my office who were in tears – more women than men. They had 
been defined by management as underperformers. I think that if you tell somebody 
they are rubbish at their job for so long, they’ll begin to believe they are rubbish and 
that’s what was happening. The pressure that is stacking up on people is immense and 
it is very difficult to withstand. (Telecom CWU, Clerical Branch Officer)  
 
7.10 Gender Discrimination and Disadvantage 
 
Many reported that Performance Management and its attendant practices and outcomes 
disproportionately disadvantaged women . The national officer with responsibility for the 
voluntary sector cited organisations’ policies on lateness as a good example.  
 
When organisations have tight policies for lateness, women are clearly more 
likely to be on the receiving end. I say to the reps that if a woman is being put on 
a disciplinary for lateness then if the cause is childcare or a sick kid then these are 
issues for women in relation to their health and well-being. These circumstamnces 
have to be considered, but women do not usually like to divulge that type of 
information, and it’s usually a male who is sitting opposite them at a hearing. 
(National Officer Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union) 
 
Women’s responsibility for child-rearing often clashed with the dictates of Performance 
Management. Nowhere was this reported to be more a problem than in the call centre 
environment, according to this testimony.  
 
Women are under constant pressure. If a child is ill, for example, the woman 
might put them into nursery and then feel bad about it, but if she does not come to 
work then she will not get her bonus. She might already have had two or three 
days off, so there’s added pressure and then when she comes into work her mind 
can’t completely focus, so that she’s maybe a bit short with the numbers or curt 
with the customers. You might be unlucky enough for that conversation to be 
overhead so you get pulled in. And many women use such circumstances as 
mitigation, ‘Oh the reason I did that was because my boy’s not well and my 
daughter’s not well and I’m feeling really awful and I dragged myself into work 
today’. They don’t acknowledge the validity of these reasons so they say, ‘Just 
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take the punishment’, but before they know it, they are back in front of the boss 
again and it is a written warning. (Workplace rep, Bank B, 1 October 2010) 
 
Several respondents reported on the failure of organizations in both the private and the 
public sector to undertake an equality impact assessment as to whether management 
policies and practices were ‘reasonable and practicable’.  Respondents cited examples of 
bad practice, often in relation to pregnancy and maternity leave. It was reported that 
 
…employers frequently pressurise women into taking their maternity leave sooner 
because it is too much hassle for them to conduct a continuous risk assessment for 
pregnant women. Management are saying, ‘Well, if you are not fit enough to 
work as want you to then you should just go on maternity leave’. (National 
Officer, Voluntary Sector, Unite the Union)  
 
The experience of the Branch Secretary responsible for clerical workers in the telecoms 
serctor was that part-time women were disproportionately being put on short-term 
development plans, which for many could be a path to disciplinary action and then to 
exit.  
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8. Union Reponses to Performance Management 
 
8.1   National Level 
 
It is beyond the scope of the research and this report to consider in detail the nature and 
effectiveness of union responses to Performance Management. From the interviews, 
officers and reps acknowledged the importance of attempting to negotiate with employers 
at national level. Performance Management emerged as a major - indeed the single most 
important - industrial relations issue in British Telecom from 2010 to the present. The 
CWU has made strenuous efforts over several years to combat Perfomance Management 
and the negative effects for workers. Despite the best efforts of national negotiators such 
was the depth of anger at, and opposition to, Performance Management at the 2011 CWU 
Telecoms Conference that a motion was passed overwhelmingly demanding the removal 
of Performance Management in its entirety.  
 
As the union magazine reported (CWU, 2011), Conference committed the union to the 
most comprehensive fightback against the entire ethos and culture of Performance 
Management in BT ‘since the current process was adopted by the company in 2008’. The 
unanimous vote by delegates was to demand that the company cease its ‘cavalier and 
brutal’ application of these policies by 30 November 2011, or the union would initiate a 
ballot for industrial action. While the detail of the progress of the issue through the union 
lies beyond the scope of this report, it should be noted that industrial action was averted 
through the promise by the company of talks. However, as was reported in the union 
magazine (CWU, 2012), the issues of concern to members remained unresolved. In a 
ballot of members conducted by the CWU, as many as 38 per cent believed that the 
situation had actually deteriorated while more than 50 per cent believed that no change 
had occurred since the company and the union commenced talks.  
 
In the finance sector where Unite the Union has recognition, it has attempted to negotiate 
with employers over Performance Management and the concerns of members in the 
particular companies. To repeat, for national officers and reps Performance Management 
and sickness absence issues have become key items on the bargaining agenda. It is 
suggested that further research should be underataken to evaluate the degree of success 
unions have achieved at national level in terms of bargaining outcomes.  
 
From the interview evidence, officers and reps reported on the arguments marshaled 
against Performance Management. Prominent in the union case taken to financial services 
organizations were the arguments against the Bell curve when it became clear that 
companies were using forced distributions in ranking employees. Unite the Union  
contended that forced distrtibution did not, and could not, accurately represent actual 
performance, however that was defined. The national officer of Bank A, through this 
telling caricature, challenged the rationale for its usage.  
 
We would ask the question over and again. ‘If you have five Einsteins in your 
team and you have the best team in the world that you possibly could have, are 
you still contending that somebody should be performance managed?’ 
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‘Absolutely’ was the response. And then we used the reverse and said, ‘If you had 
five idiots in your team, do you thing someone should be exceeding expectations? 
And she went, ‘Don’t be ridiculous’. So the performance management Bell curve 
isn’t about rewarding those who are doing good, it’s about battering people who 
are also doing good. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
Evidence was provided also of union opposition at the national level to the operation of 
the Bell curve on the grounds of gender discrimaination. The senior  seconded rep in 
Bank C recalled how the union had effectively challeneged the distribution of grades by 
gender. When management had denied that Performance Management and the 
distribution of rankings were flawed and discriminatory in practice, the union would 
respond. 
 
How is it that all the 4s and the 5s are men? The message went out that if there 
were too many women getting 4s and 5s, then they would have to have some of 
the ratings taken off them and given to women. They were exposed as 
compromising gender equality. So now they have to put returns in half way 
through the year which includes a gender breakdown and they have to be seen to 
be fair (Bank C, Senior Seconded Rep)  
 
Putting forward such a case at national level indicates that there are opportunities for 
union intervention that can have some impact.  
 
8.2   Workplace Level  
 
Evidence has been collected from diverse sources on the sorts of action that have been 
taken and, equally important, might be taken at workplace level by union representatives 
in defence of members who face the deleterious consequences of Performance 
Management. Such initiatives relate particularly to alleged underperformance and the 
disciplinary consequences that might follow, but might include perceptions of unfairness 
in rankings. While national officers and seconded reps have provided valuable 
information, workplace reps and delegates at union conferences and seminars have 
passionaterly debated the issues surrounding Performance Management, delivering 
important  suggestions for effective improvements at workplace level. In truth, as reps 
have emphasised, the national and the workplace levels are not mutually exclusive and 
union actions at both levels can complement each other.  
 
8.2.1   Challenging Rankings Following Appraisal 
 
The point of departure for action at workplace level is the fact that very high levels of 
dissatisfaction exist among members in all of the case study companies considered in this 
report. One of the biggest sources of discontent was widely reported to be the very 
common instance where employees are either hitting their targets or believe they are 
doing so, but then are put into a category of being an underperformer at their appraisal. 
There is evidence of union effectiveness, but initial examples tended to focus on 
individual cases, where workers were contesting rankings that they had been given at 
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appraisal. These were post-hoc challenges – appeals after the event as it were – and 
involved the union in committing significant resources to individual casework. In one 
section of Bank A where they used the Bell curve, officers and reps were  ‘just constantly 
doing casework in..we knew what was going on, so we appealed case after case and we 
won every one’. (Bank A National Officer) Where unions have pursued such appeals 
every indication is that they can be successful. Branch officers of the Swansea and 
Valleys CWU reported that they had won a string of cases where workers wanted to 
challenge their ranking.  
 
It seems that the greatest success in these appeals has been achieved where management 
has been ‘over zealous’ and individuals rankings were regarded as unfair and 
precipitately leading to disciplinary action. However, reps reported that many workers 
were just as likely to hope for their problem to go away and not to appeal the ranking. 
Reps believed that creating an awareness at workplace level that employees could and 
should appeal ratings perceived to be unfair was one of the most important tasks facing 
the union. At a Unite the Union educational course, one rep expressed this task by saying 
the union must create a culture of ‘Appeal, appeal and appeal again!!’ in every workplace 
(Change at Work, Eastbourne 6 September 2012).  
 
8.2.2    Challenging Objectives and Targets 
 
It should be emphasised that unions are only now beginning to develop workplace based 
responses to the threats of Performance Management. While appealing unfair rankings 
has been identified as an essential element in a wider campaign against performance 
Management, reps are developing the understanding of the importance of being proactive 
and anticipatory as well as reactive. Such an approach implies intervention at the earlier 
stages of the Performance Management cycle (see Diagram 1). For example, at the 
planning stage of the cycle at which objectives are mutually agreed or, more accurately, it 
is claimed that they are agreed, there is scope for reps and members to raise objections to 
what might be considered as excessive and unachievable targets. Challenging targets is a 
good example of an issue which required a challenge at both the national and the local 
level. Officers reported on the importance of including workload and targets in national 
argaining agendas. 
 
…ther point we’ve been arguing all along is that targets need to be adjusted 
downwards and considerably, because there is a recession on and people’s ability 
to buy has been curtailed. (Bank A National Officer)  
 
Reps, meanwhile, emphasised the need to challenge individuals in a manner similar to the 
individual challenges over rankings.  
 
Similarly, there can be proactivity in terms of the support stage of the cycle. Reps and 
members can place the onus on managers to provide the necessary development that 
might be promised for workers who are deemed to require improvement. At the Change 
at Work course reps recommended the importance of continuing to make demands on 
management for such support whilst keeping a record of all requests and management 
73 
 
responses. Reps experience was that management frequently did not follow through on 
the promises to deliver the support necessary to improve performance. Such a failure 
should not lead to disciplinary action if and when employees then were judged to have 
underperformed. Rather management  should be challenged for not having delivered the 
resources and the support for individual employees to make necessary improvements to 
their performance.  
 
8.2.3  Challenging Management Over Absences  
 
Several respondents insisted on the importance of workers reporting the reasons why they 
might have been absent or late for childcare, family-related or gynaecological reasons. If 
workers reported circumstances, such as a sick child or cramps from periods, then at least 
these circumstances could be cited in mitigation should that employee face a disciplinary. 
Union officers reported that the problem often lay in individuals lacking the confidence 
to report such circumstances. This reluctance makes it imperative that unions and their 
represerntatives were visible and acceesible to members, so that they could be involved at 
an early stage in the development of potential disciplinary proceedings.  
 
8.2.4  Challenging Managed Exits  
 
Reps reported that they often only became aware that workers might be experiencing 
performance problems when they were facing the prospect of being exited from their 
organization. While reps emphasised that the aim should be for workers to be proactive 
and to challenge managerial assessments of performance prior to the eleventh hour, they 
also reported on their experiences, particularly the circumstances where they had 
successfully defended members. Several reps and national officers reported how recourse 
to the Disability Discimination Act (DDA) had stmied management’s attempts to get rid 
of people, 
 
…if they are managing someone out of the organization, as soon as you mention 
the DDA they take a big step backwards because they have not thought the case 
through. Our reps are pretty much well versed, particularly our senior reps, on the 
extent of DDA’s coverage. (Bank A National Officer) 
 
The more general point that was made in terms of successfully challenging ‘managed 
exits’ at the late stage was the importance of scrutinising management’s adherence to 
procedure. One senior rep from the insurance sector recalled. 
 
I personally won four cases in a row last year, even though  If I am being honest 
we didn’t win everything lastv year – far from it – but the ones we won were 
down to them not following procedure and us being really sharp – asking where 
the evidence, why didn’t you do that? To me managers are getting sloppy because 
they are streteched and under pressure themselves. They make mistakes on 
individual cases all the time. (Insurance 3, Senior Rep) 
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The national officer for the voluntary sector identified intiatives that could be taken by 
the union at workplace level to challenge managed exits. 
 
The problem that reps face is that managers at local level are often being 
pressurised as well. I am not sticking up for them but they’ve been told by their 
managers, ‘You’ll need to get rid and we don’t have redundancies on the cards so 
if this person is late, get them on conduct or capability or performance 
management’, There are so many different criteria that apply. Reps need to 
challenge managers’ actions by referring to company policy, to inconsistences 
and to the the legislation. For example, we have had a case where a woman was 
dismissed when she had an ongoing long-term mental health issue. Her attendance 
was not great but she had a good sound reason for it and they just dismissed her, 
contrary to the DDA. She had divulged her illness so we could contest their 
actions. Representation is not always easy because of the vulnerability of 
individuals who may have other issues, but such cases require reps to be quick to 
respond and build a case for the individual. Because management actions are 
often excessive and breach procedure and/or legislation there are certainly 
opportunities. (National officer, voluntary sector, Unite the Union) 
 
What performance management is doing, especially in respect of conduct and capability, 
is enabling management to assert its right to management more emphatically. The lesson 
that many were drawing was the need to be prepared to challenge this right.     
 
8.2.5 The Challenge of How to Collectivise Grievances   
 
A key theme to emerge from the union officer and reps interviews was the challenge of 
how to collectivise the union response. The extent of greievance and disciplinary action 
against employees inescapably entails the commitment of considerable resources on the 
part of the union in representing and supporting individuals. Unite’s national officer for 
the voluntary sector acutely observed, ‘reps  have been trying to stem the flow for years 
and years, dealing with individual case after individual case which is soul destroying’. 
From this officer’s perspective, a productive approach was to use an organizing approach 
to meet with reps and shop stewards regularly, co-ordinate case work, approach 
management collectively and, as as possible, seek opportunities to organize and to 
recruit. Reps in the finance sector participating in the Change at Work educational 
programme are actively engaged in developing guidance for members on Performance 
Management which has the objective of developing self-activity amongst members and 
less dependence on reps and officers.  
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9. Non-Union Workplaces and Vulnerable Workers 
 
If employees in unionised environments are experiencing unprecedented pressures in 
their working lives, according to union respondents, then workers in unorganised 
workplaces, where there is no collective bargaining and representation, should be 
expected to be even more exposed. Several studies, particularly those on ‘vulnerable 
workers’ have evidenced the weakness of employees who lack employee protection. (e.g. 
Pollert, 2007; 2010). 
 
Studies on vulnerable workers have drawn upon data of the grievances that workers have 
taken to the Citizens Advice Bureaux and Law Centres, to which workers are compelled 
to seek guidance. For this report, a lengthy interview was conducted with the Director of 
an Employee Advice and Employment Rights Centre (EAERC) in the West of Scotland, 
to which many workers from unorganised (and even organised) workplaces bring 
grievances. He reported,  
 
The more serious cases we get are issues relating to people who are about to be 
dismissed. Growing numbers of people are coming to us with things like 
capability dismissals. Within these cases a lot involve mental health problems. 
We do get the odd call from a union member who can’t locate their steward or 
officer, but the heavy stuff tends to be where there’s no support mechanism. 
 
The Director provided the example of a non-union outsourced contact centre in the 
locality where workers had been subject to a ‘humiliating’ form of Performance 
Management. Employees had been identified, targeted, removed from their teams and 
placed in an ‘underperforming team’, the Phoenix Team, where they were given a tight 
improvement plan (PIP). Insight can be gained from the text of two emails sent by the 
then recently appointed site manager to the workforce in the autumn of 2009.  
 
Considering these two emails together, several obeservations can be made about the 
purpose and tenor of the Phoenix initiative. First, employees are presented with what 
seems to be the inescapable logic of the company’s perilous financial position which 
necessitates and justifies a wholesale change in the behaviours of significant numbers of 
the workforce.  According to the EAERC Director, managerial practices were tantamount 
to ‘psychological bullying’ and no fewer than 10 per cent of the workforce had made 
contact with the EAERC either by phone or in person.  
 
The tall ships analogy was simply a verbal and written expression of the Bell 
Curve, so when they were saying, ‘some people don’t want to be here’, ‘some 
people do’, ‘some people are good’, ‘some people are bad’ and so on, that was the 
driving force behind this whole strategy. In each department there were Phoenix 
teams.  
 
Underlying the Phoenix team initiative and the implementation of the Bell curve was the 
more fundamental driver of ramping up productivity and reducing labour costs.  
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The Phoenix teams were in effect a disciplinary measure and were viewed as 
such. There were also implications for bonuses, for while you were in a Phoenix 
team there were elements of your contract that were frozen. So they used it for 
different puposes – psychologically, financially, physically, disciplinary. While 
many in the workforce thought it was chaotic, I think it was a very, very skillful 
deliberate managerial strategy.  
 
Email 1  
 
Team, 
When I started here last November, I spent a good deal of time observing how we worked. It lead me to 
believe that we had 3 distinct groups of people common amongst all levels of our organisation and I 
categorised them using the ‘Tall Ship’ analogy. 
  
Firstly we had a group of people that I think had quit but decided to stay. Basically, the job is comfortable, 
they don’t have a great deal of engagement, but they can’t be bothered with finding something else either, 
better the devil you know blah blah blah kind of thing. You could call this group of people ‘passengers’.  
  
The second group of people I think are more disruptive. These people I believe actually dislike the 
company and enjoy cultivating an anti-establishment culture, people who throw sickies rather than come to 
work, or work harder at avoiding calls than taking them. I would call this group of people ‘anchors’. 
  
The final group, and thankfully the group that I believe are in the majority are those people that care about 
our place in this community. Who come to work to do a good job and make a difference to people, both 
colleagues and customers alike.These are the most important people here, the ‘crew’. 
 
Often this group is a silent majority, not always willing to be publicly positive about our company as they 
wish not to appear as brown nosers. It got me thinking that we’ve spoken about these categories of people 
and discussed the need to change on many separate occasions. We’ve changed the leadership structure 
to reflect the need to address passengers and anchors. We’ve focussed on making this a better place to 
work. 
  
Performance hasn’t changed much though………Now we are at the time for action. I have asked the 
leadership team today to focus on our poor performers, our passengers and anchors with a relentless 
determination and sense of urgency until we have either brought people on board as crew, or we have 
parted company for the better for us all. This starts today, so these people can expect a conversation with 
their line manager within the next few days. 
  
This in itself will make this a better place to work. I recognise that it’s going to be a tough few months for 
people, but I want you to know that we are doing this for the benefit of our ‘crew’. They deserve a great 
place to work, and I’m determined to give it to them. 
  
Regards, 
Site Manager 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Email2  
Hi All, 
I’d like to give you an update on our restructure and share some views on our business and our future at 
XXXX. Right now we are at the beginning of a new chapter, we are well on the way to creating an 
environment that really is “The Best Place to Work”. We have a new Operational Management team and 
are currently investing a great deal of time to recruit every TL and ATL position by the end of July. This is 
a significant investment in our leadership structure at a time when every pound spent is under scrutiny. 
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We should all be aware of the fact that [the parent company] recently issued a profit warning, indicating 
that XXXX is contributing to this. This has rightly caused us concern and speculation is rife as to the future 
of XXXX in the UK.  
  
I am no fortune teller, but I can share with you my belief that our future is absolutely in our hands. Over 
1000 people work in our place, and given that the average number of people in our direct family is 10, this 
means that over 10,000 people will be affected by the choices we make every day. 
  
The key to our success is in these choices we make. We have a choice to come to work with a positive 
attitude and a smile on our faces. To have fun doing our work. To deliver an excellent customer 
experience.To work more efficiently. To think commercially about cost avoidance and sales opportunities. 
To challenge each other to live the XXXX values. 
  
We have a choice to do all of the above, some of the above or none of the above. If we choose to do 
these things we maintain control of our future and we will be successful. I’m already starting to notice a 
change in the choices people are making, and it is bringing us success already, check this out: 
  
Operational Efficiency. 
Right now, at Greenock we have knocked over 20 seconds off our average call handling time. This makes 
us massively more efficient. With huge focus on the XXXX cost base we have to prove that we can work 
as efficiently as possible, this will be key in securing our future.  
  
Best Place to Work 
In order to make this the Best Place to Work we all need to play our part. I want everyone who works here 
to love coming to work and I am committed to making this happen. Please feel free to share your views 
with me on the things that can make this happen. 
  
Customer Experience  
Combined with the increased focus on Operational Efficiency we have seen week on week improvement 
in ICCA scores. A 30 point rise in the last 4 weeks. 
Week                   20          21       22         23         
Overall Score      32          45       52         62 
  
This proves to me that we can be more efficient and still improve upon the customer experience. We are 
nothing without our customers, they pay our bills. We have to keep focussed on delighting our customers 
at every opportunity. 
   
Commercial Performance: 
  
We have reduced the volume of credits and adjustment by 50% - this saves our business thousands of 
pounds every day. 
  
L&R Insurance sales have increased from 6.8% (Jan – April) to 12.3% (May). The TOMS present rate in 
Premier Services has increased month on month from Jan to date from 53% to 72%.  
 
As observed above in relation to the discussion of targets and KPIs, employees were 
rated on diverse targets, including Average Call Handling Times (ACHTs), TOMS (sales, 
lead generation and data capture) and a customer feeback evaluation process called 
FIZZBACK. Thus, for a worker to be relocated to a Phoenix team they would have to be 
deemed to be underperforming in overall terms against these criteria. For example, the 
required ACHT was 340 seconds, which included wrap time. Underperformers would be 
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given stringent improvement plans with very tight deadlines under the disciplinary 
procedure, as this excerpt from an employee letter reveals.  
 
I am writing to you following the Performance Improvement Plan (PiP) meeting 
that was held on Saturday…In this meeting we reviewed and discussed your 
performance and noted in the meeting notes that you have not met the required 
standard. You will therefore be issued with a first stage warning effective from 
last Saturday and it will remain on your file for twelve months. Please note that 
any entitlement to company bonus payment may be reduced or withdrawn in 
accordance with the bonus scheme rules. You have the right to appeal within 
seven days. Your PIP will be monitored for a review for a period of two weeks. In 
the event you do not meet the required standard you will be invited to a further 
improvement plan. (Excerpt from PIP Letter to X-Phone employee) 
 
In practice, at X-Phone the performance improvement process was often inseparable from 
the displinary procedure. In this case the conflation of the two was complete as the 
employee was given the date and the time of what would be his next disciplinary hearing 
before the two weeks’ review period had ended. There was a six weeks’ exit plan; three 
continuous episodes of two week long PIPs attached to disciplinary outcomes.  
According to the Dirtector of the EAER, the Phoenix team initiative was profoundly 
damaging for may workers 
 
In addition to employees presenting at the centre with problems over performance 
management issues and targets,  absence management was a major reported grievance.  
 
Absence management is the residual stuff that has been going on for years, where 
the employers every now and again have a cull of long term sick people. Certainly 
mental health problems comprises the largest and most significant group, the 
whole gamut – anxiety, depression , stress…The perception by the workers would 
be that work has contributed to these disorders even if they have not completely 
caused them. I do not think that the employers objectives were anything other 
than getting rid of the workers. I’ve never come across an absence management 
policy that was sympathetic to the employees. (EAERC, Director) 
 
In the Director’s experience dismissal on the grounds of capability has become 
increasingly common. On the basis of a doctor’s evaluation that an individual will not be 
able to return to work in the foreseeable future, they can be dismissed on the grounds of 
capability, one of the five potentially fair reasons for dismissal in employment law.  
 
The experiences of employees in the outsourced contact centre is not untypical of many 
employees working in non-union environments, in which little restraint exists in terms of 
their exercise of Performance Management practices. Such experiences raise the 
importance of gaining union recognition, in order for employees to benefit from even a 
basic level of protection and representation. 
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10. Conclusion   
 
The mainstream Human Resource Management (HRM) literature depicts Performance 
Management as a harmonious process for improving organisational effectiveness through 
aligning individual employees with organizational objectives. The textbooks repeatedly 
emphasise the mutuality of interest between employees and employers and how the 
process depends on agreement between the parties, shared objectives and consensus. 
Underpinning all conceptions of Performance Management is the performance cycle, 
composed of the three stages of planning, supporting and reviewing performance. 
Although the process is held to be continuous and the stages are not discrete, appraisal 
systems have historically been seen as the most important phase, being related to the 
reward systems and Performance Related Pay. Appraisal has embraced ever widening 
groups of employees, extending beyond managerial and professional layers to encompass 
technical, white-collar and even manual workers. Invariably, appraisals involve some 
form of ranking and rating of employees, by which performance is evaluated typically 
according to alphabetical or numerical categories. A deep-rooted assumption prevalent in 
the HRM textbooks is that such ratings are encouraging and reward employee effort and 
performance. Low ratings and underperformance were seen not negatively, but as a 
positive opportunity for employees to improve themelves and for employers to develop 
their most important resource.  
 
Insofar as Performance Management was synonymous with appraisal, it tended to be a 
relatively straightforward, typically annual review between a manager and their 
subordinate. In acknowledgement of the perfunctory manner in which the appraisal was 
often conducted, some referred to it as a dishonest annual ritual. Others acknowledged 
the potential for bias in the process so that developments such as balanced scorecards or 
360 degree appraisal were embraced as overcoming flaws.  
 
Over time, though, Performance Management evolved beyond episodic pay-related 
appraisal to become tighter, more prescriptive even all-encompassing. It has increasingly 
sought to incorporate issues and stages that are central to HRM more generally, from 
recruitment, through training, capability procedures and termination (e.g. Boxall and 
Purcell). Marchington and Wilkinson (2008) maintain that for some Performance 
Management has become synonymous with the totality of day-to-day management 
activity because it is concerned with how work can be organized in order to achieve the 
best results. It is acknowledged that Performance Management is now bound up with 
organization-wide targets and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Although some 
mainstream academics suggest that these new forms of Performance Management might, 
through their focus on continuous employee improvement, involve a harder managerial 
practice (Houldsworth, 2004), the dominant view is developmental and that, 
prescriptively, this stringent version is an ill-conceived departure from ‘authentic’ 
Performance Management and HRM.  
 
There has been criticism of Performance Management on several grounds; for example, 
that it compromises a line manager’s role as counsellor with that of judge and appraiser. 
Many highlight the potential for bias, but again the HRM literature minimises this 
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problem and advocates standardization practices as a solution. It is within the practices of 
score ‘normalisation’ that there lies the roots of a difficulty. What would be the effects on 
employees if ratings were dependent upon the allocation of fixed sums of money which 
effectively restricted the numbers of employees who could be given higher rankings on 
the grounds of limited budget? In this context, one particular form of scale or ranking that 
has emerged has been the forced ‘normal’ distribution or Bell curve, in which fixed 
proportions of a workforce population are accorded a priori defined categories.  
 
The major problem with such a distribution is that it is, in essence, a statistical exercise in 
which the actual performance of workers will bear little reference to this predetermined 
categorization. Most notably, managers are compelled to identify a fixed percentage of 
the workforce as underperformers irrespective of their actual performance. The UK 
academic literature suggests that such an inequitable practice as the Bell curve is very 
limited. It should be noted that in the US context, Michels et al (2001) in their influential 
book ‘The War for Talent’, recommended the removal of the bottom 10 per cent of the 
workforce each year as their continued presence would serve to de-motivate the high 
performers. There is no evidence to support this assertion. In sum, despite criticism of 
Performance Management from within HRM and a more theoretically inspired critique 
(Townley, 1993), the dominant assumption is of Performance Management as essentially 
supportive of employees.  
 
The present study fundamentally challenges this perspective. Crucially, it argues that the 
evolution of Performance Management to become the more systematic, integrated and 
all-embracing system has not happened within a political-economic, soiciological and 
organizational vacuum. What has taken place in the past two decades has been a sea 
change in the political economy of work and employment, the adoption of a neo-liberal 
agenda, which has unambiguously strengthened managerial prerogative (Daniels and 
McIlroy, 2009). It is not necessary here to repeat the detail presented in Section 6, but 
merely to re-iterate the core of the argument.  
 
To the extent that HRM had a soft as well as a hard side (Storey, 1992) much of former 
has been shed, eroded or undermined in conditions of intense market competition, cost 
minimisation and subsequently crisis and recession. The growth of forms of lean working 
has led, not to creative outcomes, but to re-engineering and micro-management. 
Deskilling, the fragmentation of tasks and repetitive and speeded-up work are the 
outcomes. ‘Doing more with less’ to use the ubiquitous injunction has led to a significant 
intensification of work and to widespread sickness and ill-health, exacerbated by 
organisations’ harsh sickness absence regimes. 
 
The primary evidence, principally from the front-line of financial services and telecoms, 
demonstrates unequivocally that the evolved form of performance management, within 
these contexts, is synonymous not with developmental HRM and agreed objectives but 
with a claustrophobically monitored experience of top-down target driven work. The 
trade union respondents overwlemingly concur that the watershed in Performance 
Management, the implementation of tough measures with explicitly disciplinary intent 
pre-dated the financial crisis of 2007-8. However, crisis and recession then accelerated 
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these trends, intensifying the micro-measurement and management of worker effort and 
performance. While the measurements of work output remained key, they were 
accompanied by the systematic evaluation of behaviours and attitudes, criteria far more 
subjective and open to abuse than even the pseudo-scientific quantitative categories.  
 
The real bite in Performance Management lies not so much in the measurements, the 
monitoring and the evaluations in themselves but in the disciplinary purposes to which 
they are allied. The variously named performance improvement plans and procedures 
(e.g. PiPs), with the corrective and punitive actions that are implied, are a source of 
widespread job insecurity amongst the workforces represented by our respondents. 
However, the lynchpin of this harsh and oppressive system is the Bell curve and the 
forced distribution of employee performance rankings which stigmatises a certain 
percentage of the workforce as underperformers, irrespective of actual performance, and 
sets many of them up for a process of ‘managed’ exit from the organization. 
Organisations may deny the existence of the Bell curve but the evidence is compelling 
that organizations use it wholeheartedly and not merely in an indicative manner. The 
extent to which organizations have driven ‘managed exits’ is staggering.  
 
The testimony of the whistleblower, the former HR Manager from the 
telecommunications company, provides the most shocking testimony of the extent to 
which a company might engineer employees’ departure from their employment. The 
sinister practice of the ‘car park conversation’, which served to drive people out of the 
company in the most ruthless manner, was merely the worst example of inhumane 
treatment of the workforce. For this manager the mental ill-health outcomes were the 
breaking point, forcing them to leave the company they had served for 25 years.  
 
It was impossible in a qualitative study of this scope to establish statistical relationships 
between Perfromance Management and occupationally-related ill-health, particularly 
mental ill-health. However, the widespread testimony of respondents both in interviews 
and in the discussions and debates occurring at seminars and conferences indicates the 
stressful consequences for workers arising from the new regimes of work. Of course, 
further studies will be required to explore in greater depth the relationships between 
Performance Management and occupational ill-health 
 
The veracity of the interview evidence presented here might be questioned by those 
wishing to downplay the detrimental consequences of Performance Management for 
employees. The respondents here are trade union officers and respondents. What they  
have done more than anything is to report honestly their own experiences and those of the 
members they represent. In fact, it can be argued that their particular positions as officers 
for, and representatives of, the many 1000s of employees makes them privileged witness 
to workers’ ‘private troubles’.  
 
What is most striking is the fact that the phenomena that they describe are so consistent 
across organisations and place that the evidence is compelling regarding the extent and 
the severity of the problems being experienced by workers under these new regimes of 
Performance Management. The primary evidence also is consistent with that presented in 
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Section 6 above from studies of the ill-health outcome of lean work and the 
intensification of work. Invariably, these accounts testify to the widespread extent to 
which employees are facing these difficulties; this is not a matter of handfuls of untypical 
employees under duress. Two quotes have been selected as representative of many which 
indicate the prevalence of the difficulties facing employees arising from Performance 
Management. 
 
The biggest subject that any of my members talk to me about is this constant 
monitoring, constant process, constant pressure. I could go out into the street and 
flag down any guy in a BT van and ask him what is his biggest problem and I will 
guarantee he will say to me the tracker or performance management – one of the 
two of them. Performance Management, in my opinion,  is at the very heart of the 
problems that we have got in the workplace and which take the form of the rise in 
mental ill-health. (Telecoms, CWU, Regional Officer) 
 
I could take you into any call centre in the finance sector and for that matter 
probably any call centre that deals with what is called the mass market and ask 
anyone working there, ‘What is your biggest problem?’.  They are almost certain 
to say, ‘Targets, constant pressure, Performance Management, never any let up, 
fear’.  (Insurance A, Senior Rep) 
 
A final argument can be made that these Performance Management practices are not 
merely unjustifiable on grounds of welfare, decency, dignity and well-being, but that they 
may also be utterly counterproductive from a managerial perspective. They require 
enormous commitments of resource by middle and front-line management and serve 
merely to create a deep well of resentment and discontent amongst a highly pressursied 
workforce. Perhaps one of the gurus of Human Resource Management demonstrated an 
unwitting presience when he wrote in 1987.  
 
Performance management has a poor record of success, and the temptation is to 
engage in a spiral of control in an attempt to extract more effort and ever higher 
performance from employees through policies and practices that may succeed 
only in further de-motivating and which are, thereby, ultimately self-defeating. 
(Guest, 1987) 
 
However, the final word might best go to a long serving national officer of the CWU who 
identified the root cause of the intensified pressure upon workers as lying in the 
progressive transformation of employee management systems.  
 
There was a creeping process of change which involved a continuous ratcheting 
up of the pressure on workers. The first step was the replacement of personnel 
management with human resource management and the parallel shift from quality 
management to total quality management. Then performance management was 
added on TQM, after which total quality was forgotten and the emphasis was 
focused exclusively on performance. As the years have advanced the noose has 
been progressively tighted round workers’ necks. (CWU Regional Officer) 
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Appendix 1 
Performance Management:  
Schedule of Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews with Trade Union Officers and Reps 
 
Emergence of Performance Management 
 When did you first become aware of Performance Management in the organisation in which you 
are/were a rep or have responsibility for as a branch, regional or national officer? 
 
 What were the drivers behind the introduction of Performance Management? What were the purposes 
of Performance Management from the company’s/organisation’s perspective?  
 
 What did the process of Performance Management consist of in terms of both the company’s 
rationale and the detail of the process?  
 
Evolution of and Change in Performance Management 
 Has Performance Management changed over time? If so, in what ways did the rationale for, and the 
content of, Performance Management change? Were there significant turning points and, if so, what 
were they and what were the main outcomes? (Probe for effects of the financial crisis of 2008) 
 
 To what extent and in what ways has Performance Management expanded from and come to 
encompass more than Performance Appraisal? 
 
 What forms of measurement and evaluation did Performance Management come to involve?      
(Probe quantitaive targets, qualitative monitoring, behaviours, attitudes etc.) 
 
 What were the relative degrees of emphasis placed upon reward and development/improvement 
respectively?  
 
Performance Improvement 
 Elaborate on the ‘improvement’ aspects of the Performance Management cycle, such as PIP (Personal 
Improvement Plan) measures. 
 
 To what extent are PIPs (or their equivalents) developmental in intent and  execution and to what 
extent are they punitive? If the latter, then, does performance deemed to be sub-optimal lead to 
involuntary exit and if so to what extent? 
 
 To what extent is the growth of Performance Management related to work intensification, the spread 
of lean working and changes in the management of sickness absence?  
 
 How is performance categorised? Does your company/organisation, or the one(s) for which you are 
responsible, use forms of forced distribution, such as the Bell Curve?  
 
Effects on Employees 
 What have been the effects on employees and your members? (Open question and then probe for 
pressure, intensity of work, insecurity, disciplinary action, sickness absence, health issues, including 
stress, anxiety and depression? Are these effects gendered?  
 
 What have been the union responses to Performance Management and its effects on workers and 
members? What responses have been effective? What should and could unions do to challenge 
management policies and practices that are of detriment to members and workers generally? 
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